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IF THERE’S SOMETHING STRANGE IN YOUR WORKPLACE,
WHO YA GONNA CALL? THE SECOND CIRCUIT
EXPANDS WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
IN BERMAN v. NEO@OGILVY LLC
JOHN K. MICKLES*
“[O]ur obligation is to apply congressional statutes as written . . . .
But the SEC and the majority perceive a hole in coverage,
or an insufficiency of remedy, and are patching.”1
I. SARBANES-OXLEY BECOMES A GHOST: AN INTRODUCTION TO
DODD-FRANK AND ITS IMPACT ON FUTURE WHISTLEBLOWERS
Imagine that you are a director of finance for a publicly-traded com-
pany in 2015.2  Your expertise allowed you to identify wrongdoing in your
employer’s accounting practices.3  Unfamiliar with the federal
whistleblower protection programs, you directly report your suspicions to
your employer, rather than to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC).4  Because you reported your discoveries internally, your em-
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S., 2012, Drexel University.  This Note is dedicated to my mother, Leslie Mickles,
father, Dennis Mickles, sister, Megan Levan, girlfriend, Sarah Burke, dog, Chloe
Mickles, and friends who continue to support me throughout all my endeavors.  I
am especially grateful to everyone who provided feedback and input in writing this
Note.  Finally, I would also like to thank everyone on the Villanova Law Review for
their assistance in the publication of this Note.  The inspiration for this title comes
from the song Ghostbusters, by Ray Parker, Jr. See RAY PARKER, JR., Ghostbusters, on
GHOSTBUSTERS (Arista Records, Inc. 1984).
1. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing court’s role is to interpret and read statutes strictly).
For a further discussion of the Berman dissent, see infra notes 142–51 and accompa-
nying text.
2. See, e.g., Berman, 801 F.3d at 148–49 (describing employee’s relationship
with employer); Kristin Goodchild, Note, Securities/Administrative Law—Internal Re-
porters Who Blow the Whistle: Are They Protected Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Anti-Retalia-
tion Provision?, 38 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2016) (illustrating hypothetical
comparable to Banko v. Apple, Inc. (citing 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 752-53 (N.D. Cal.
2013))).  The author acknowledges that Goodchild’s article assisted in generating
the idea to illustrate a whistleblower scenario in this Note. See id. (illustrating
whistleblower hypothetical).  However, the hypothetical presented in this Note is
based on the facts of Berman.
3. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 149 (describing wrongdoing identified by defen-
dant’s finance director).
4. See id. (noting defendant’s financial director “did not report any allegedly
unlawful activities to the SEC”).
(357)
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ployment is subsequently terminated.5  You are left puzzled that you are
unprotected from your employer’s retaliatory actions.6
The Second and Fifth Circuits’ differing interpretations of
whistleblower protection programs have left many employees wondering
whether they will receive employer retaliation protection if they report sus-
pected wrongdoing to their employers.7  This uncertainty comes from
conflicting whistleblower protection provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)8 and its refer-
ence to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley).9  Under Dodd-
Frank, a whistleblower is any individual or group of individuals “who pro-
vides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
[SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the [SEC].”10
Additionally, under § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) of Dodd-Frank, titled “Protection of
[W]histleblowers,” employers are prohibited from retaliating against
whistleblowers in three circumstances, including those who disclose infor-
mation according to Sarbanes-Oxley.11  In contrast, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
5. See id. (attributing termination of defendant’s finance director to
“whistleblower activities”).
6. See id. (noting defendant’s finance director was fired after “[a] senior of-
ficer . . . became angry with him” for internally reporting discoveries).
7. Compare id. at 155 (holding Dodd-Frank grants protection to whistleblowers
who report wrongdoing to their employers), with Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623, 628 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding Dodd-Frank protects only
whistleblowers “who provide information relating to a violation of the securities
laws to the SEC”).  The Fifth Circuit concluded that only Sarbanes-Oxley, and not
Dodd-Frank, protects whistleblowers who report wrongdoing internally to their
employers. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623, 625 (holding Dodd-Frank does not protect
internal reporting whistleblower).
8. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and
42 of U.S. Code); Christina Pellino, Comment, Don’t Whistle While You Work—Unless
You Whistle to the SEC, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 911, 913–14 (2016) (describing
Dodd-Frank’s conflicting sections that have created ambiguity in whistleblower
protection).
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)) (enacting Sarbanes-Oxley’s
whistleblower protection program).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012); see also Whistleblower, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining whistleblower as “[a]n employee who reports
employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency”); Frank J.
Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A Comparative
Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 548 (2004)
(“‘Whistleblowing’ . . . may be defined as an attempt by an employee of a corpora-
tion or business firm to disclose what he or she believes to be wrongdoing in or by
the organization.”); What is a Whistleblower?, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
(2016), https://www.whistleblower.org/what-whistleblower [https://perma.cc/
Q9RJ-8GCH] (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (defining whistleblower as “[a]n em-
ployee who discloses information that s/he reasonably believes is evidence of ille-
gality, gross waste or fraud, mismanagement, abuse of power, [or] general
wrongdoing”).
11. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (explaining Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
protections for whistleblowers who comply with Sarbanes-Oxley).
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whistleblower program protects employees who internally report wrongdo-
ing to their supervisors.12  Because of Dodd-Frank’s reference to Sarbanes-
Oxley, the Second and Fifth Circuits are split on whether Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provisions extend beyond its statutory definition of
whistleblowers to include employees who report suspected wrongdoing in-
ternally, a protection of Sarbanes-Oxley.13  However, the Second Circuit’s
broad interpretation renders Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection
obsolete because future whistleblowers are more likely to file a claim
under Dodd-Frank due to its greater financial incentives and more stream-
lined requirements.14
In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,15 the Second Circuit addressed the issue
of whether an employee who internally reported alleged wrongdoing was
protected from retaliation under Dodd-Frank or Sarbanes-Oxley.16  The
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (defining whistleblowers as individuals
who report suspected violations to their employers).  Sarbanes-Oxley states:
No [publicly traded] company . . . or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company . . . may discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an
employee . . . because of any lawful act done by the employee—to provide
information . . . or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any con-
duct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation . . .
when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is
conducted by—
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other
person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct) . . . .
Id.
13. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2015)
(comparing § 78u-6(a)(6) with § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) and stating issue of case).
The appeal to the Second Circuit concerned the tension arising between the defi-
nition of whistleblower in § 78u-6(a)(6) and the anti-retaliation protection in
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). See id. (explaining conflict between courts).  More pre-
cisely, the issue was “whether the statutory provision applies to another provision
of the statute.” See id. at 150 (presenting issue Second Circuit decided); see also
Richard H. Kulhman et al., Who is a Whistleblower Now?, BRYAN CAVE (Mar. 17,
2017), https://www.bryancave.com/en/thought-leadership/who-is-a-whistleblow
er-now.html [https://perma.cc/43U4-S9BB] (identifying where courts are split
when comparing Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provisions).
For a further discussion of the split between the Second and Fifth Circuits, see
infra notes 75–151 and accompanying text.
14. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 2013)
(“[C]onstruing the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection provision to extend be-
yond the statutory definition of ‘whistleblowers’ renders the [Sarbanes-Oxley] anti-
retaliation provision . . . moot.”).  The Fifth Circuit noted that it is unlikely for an
employee to bring a claim under Sarbanes-Oxley compared to Dodd-Frank due to
Dodd-Frank’s benefits and incentives. See id. at 628–29 (explaining why plaintiffs
may prefer Dodd-Frank to Sarbanes-Oxley); compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b)(1)–(2),
(c) (stating Sarbanes-Oxley’s procedural requirements and financial incentives),
with 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(b)(1)(A)–(B), (h)(1)(C) (stating Dodd-Frank’s procedu-
ral requirements and financial incentives).  For a further discussion of the impact
of the Berman holding, see infra notes 181–96 and accompanying text.
15. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
16. See id. at 149 (explaining issue on appeal before Second Circuit).
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Berman majority reviewed both Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower
and “Protection of [W]histleblowers” provision that refers to Sarbanes-
Oxley.17  Despite the textual differences between the Dodd-Frank and
Sarbanes-Oxley, the majority held that both statutes protect whistleblowers
who report wrongdoing to their employers.18  The inclusion of
whistleblower protection for internal reporters does not stem from the
plain text of Dodd-Frank; rather, internal reporters are afforded these pro-
tections because the Second Circuit expanded Dodd-Frank’s statutory
reach in Berman, thereby rendering Sarbanes-Oxley moot.19  Conse-
quently, until the Supreme Court resolves the issue, employers outside the
Second, Fifth, and, most recently, Ninth Circuit will face uncertainty on
how to address whistleblower actions to prevent future liability.20
This Note argues that despite the need for increased whistleblower
protection because of corporate scandals and market crises, the Second
Circuit’s holding that Dodd-Frank permitted internal whistleblowers to
bring private actions superseded Sarbanes-Oxley, thereby rendering its
whistleblower protection program obsolete.21  Part II of this Note high-
17. See id. at 146–47 (comparing Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower
and protection provisions with those in Sarbanes-Oxley); compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1)(C) (defining whistleblowers under Sarbanes-Oxley), with 15 U.S.C.
§  78u-6(a)(6) (defining whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank).
18. See id. at 155 (granting whistleblower retaliation protection under Dodd-
Frank for internally reporting wrongdoing to employer).
19. See id. at 155 (Jacobs, J. dissenting) (declaring majority opinion inter-
preted Dodd-Frank to maximize whistleblower protection instead of following
Dodd-Frank’s strict reading).  Judge Jacobs stated
No doubt, my colleagues in the majority, assisted by the SEC or not, could
improve many federal statutes by tightening them or loosening them, or
recasting or rewriting them . . . .  But our obligation is to apply congres-
sional statutes as written.  In this instance, the alteration creates a circuit
split, and places us firmly on the wrong side of it.
Id. (citing Asadi, 720 F.3d at 620).
20. See Nicole A. Baker & Meghan E. Flinn, Second Circuit Filing Re-Ignites De-
bate over the Scope of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Protections, K&L GATES LLP: LEGAL
INSIGHT (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.klgates.com/second-circuit-filing-re-ignites-
debate-over-the-scope-of-the-dodd-frank-whistleblower-protection-provisions-11-30-
2015/ [https://perma.cc/AT84-HU89] (analyzing effect of Berman on future
cases); Nicholas S. Goldin et al., Second Circuit Holds That Dodd Frank’s Whistleblower
Protection Provisions Extend to Allegations Reported Internally Even If Not Reported to the
SEC, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP 3 (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.stblaw
.com/docs/default-source/memos/firmmemo_09_22_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
94PY-ABNG] (explaining implications of circuit split); William R. McLucas et al.,
Second Circuit Allows Whistleblower Retaliation Protection Without Reporting to SEC,
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.wil
merhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179879421
[https://perma.cc/7BFL-EYVX] (suggesting strategies for employers to limit
whistleblower retaliation liability); see also Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., No. 15-
17352, 2017 WL 908245, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017) (holding Dodd-Frank’s pro-
tection includes “those who make internal disclosures”).
21. For a further discussion of the need for courts to separate Sarbanes-
Oxley’s and Dodd-Frank’s respective whistleblower reporting programs, see infra
notes 152–96 and accompanying text.
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lights the background of the financial industry’s whistleblower regulations
and their impact before Berman.22  Part III describes the facts, procedural
history, holding, and dissent in Berman.23  Part IV analyzes the Berman ma-
jority’s reasoning and disagrees with the Second Circuit’s holding because
the three categories of anti-retaliation in Subdivisions (i)–-(iii) do not de-
fine whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank, but rather represent protected ac-
tivity and are subordinate to the express and unambiguous definition of
whistleblowers.24  Lastly, Part V examines the impact of Berman and rec-
ommends how attorneys should advise clients in similar situations until the
Supreme Court addresses this issue.25
II. GHOST OF WHISTLEBLOWERS PAST: A HISTORY OF
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
Federal courts across the United States have been called on to deter-
mine the parameters of the whistleblower protections conferred by
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.26  Although the whistleblower protec-
22. For a further discussion of the development of whistleblower protection,
see infra notes 26–94 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and reasoning in
Berman, see infra notes 95–152 and accompanying text.
24. For a critical analysis of the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Berman, see infra
notes 153–81 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the impact of Berman, see infra notes 182–97
and accompanying text.
26. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (hold-
ing Dodd-Frank sufficiently ambiguous to warrant Chevron deference to SEC’s
opinion); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d. 1088, 1092 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (applying Chevron to defer to SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank), aff’d, No.
15-17352, 2017 WL 908245 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017); Wiggins v. ING U.S., Inc., Civil
Case No. 3:14-CV-01089(JCH), 2015 WL 8779559, *1–2 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2015)
(granting motion for reconsideration in light of Berman), appeal dismissed, No. 15-
2262 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2016); Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., Case No. 4:14CV183 RLW,
2015 WL 7306443, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 19, 2015) (finding Dodd-Frank ambigu-
ous based on SEC’s interpretation and Berman); Azim v. Tortoise Capital Advisors,
LLC, No. 13-2267, 2014 WL 707235, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2014) (rejecting
defendant’s Asadi argument that would prevent plaintiff from receiving
whistleblower protection under Dodd-Frank); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding
Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL 940703, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014)
(holding Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition is ambiguous), aff’d on other
grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014); Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2 F. Supp.
3d 491, 499 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding Dodd-Frank ambiguous and deferring to
SEC’s interpretation); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 533–34
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding SEC’s interpretation resolves Dodd-Frank’s ambiguity);
Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106–07 (D. Colo. 2013) (finding plain-
tiff qualified under Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition even though plaintiff
did not externally report to SEC); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42,
44–46 (D. Mass. 2013) (adopting SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank); Rosenblum
v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition is ambiguous); Murray v. UBS
Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ.5914 (JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013)
(deferring to SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp.,
No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) (follow-
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tions in these two acts have textual differences, some courts have begun to
extend Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection beyond external reporters
of wrongdoing to include internal reporters, as well.27  As a result,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection program is becoming obsolete
because plaintiffs may now be more inclined to bring claims under Dodd-
Frank due to its additional protections, financial incentives, and
whistleblower-friendly procedural requirements.28
A. Paranormal Activity in the Business World: Financial Industry’s
Influence on Whistleblowers
In response to growing changes in the business world, Congress has
consistently implemented statutes to protect individuals from future finan-
cial crises.29  Since 1934, the SEC has been tasked with protecting the se-
curities market and investors.30  In furtherance of the SEC’s efforts to
protect and encourage whistleblowers, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley
ing SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc.,
852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994–95 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (finding Dodd-Frank
whistleblower protection for those who report information to actors other than
SEC); cf. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower is clear and does not warrant Chevron defer-
ence to SEC’s opinion); Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp.
3d 644, 656 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (finding Dodd-Frank unambiguous), aff’d, No. 15-
6397, 2017 WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), petition for cert. denied, No. 16-946,
2017 WL 434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017); Puffenbarger v. Engility Corp., 151 F. Supp.
3d 651, 664–65 (E.D. Va. 2015) (concluding Asadi decision is persuasive); En-
glehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *9
(M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (holding Dodd-Frank’s statutory language is unambigu-
ous); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644–46 (E.D. Wis.
2014) (adopting Asadi reasoning); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756–57
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (denying deferral to SEC’s interpretation because Dodd-Frank’s
definition of whistleblower is not ambiguous); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., Civil
Action No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *4–6 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013)
(interpreting Dodd-Frank’s statutory language as unambiguous), aff’d, 571 F.
App’x 698 (10th Cir. 2014).
27. For a further discussion of the split between courts, see infra notes 76–94
and accompanying text.
28. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628–29 (explaining why future plaintiffs prefer
Dodd-Frank to Sarbanes-Oxley).  For a further discussion of differences between
Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley, see infra notes 40–63 and accompanying text.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (describing whistleblower protection
for employees who directly report wrongdoing to SEC); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2012) (implementing whistleblower protection for employees
who internally provide information to employers).  For a further discussion of
Congress’s and the SEC’s efforts to protect individuals from future financial crises,
see supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
30. See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/5TEC-SUHQ] (last modified June 10, 2013)
(detailing SEC’s history).  For a further discussion of the purpose of the SEC, see
infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
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and Dodd-Frank and included provisions protecting whistleblowers in
each Act.31
1. Ghostbusters Headquarters: The Creation of the SEC
There was little interest in federal regulation of the securities markets
prior to the creation of the SEC in 1934.32  However, the Great Depression
prompted Congress to pass the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) to
restore the public’s confidence in markets.33  In conjunction with the Se-
curities Act, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) es-
tablished the SEC with a mission to “protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”34  The Ex-
31. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (ex-
plaining purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley is “to protect investors by improving the accu-
racy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”);
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 250–51 (2009) (“In the aftermath of the economic crisis of
2008, we believe that it is the responsibility of Congress to take action to prevent
such a crisis from occurring again.”); Mary Jo White, Statement on the Anniversary of
the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 16, 2015), https://www.sec
.gov/news/statement/statement-on-the-anniversary-of-the-dodd-frank-act.html
[https://perma.cc/38AU-SPAN] (“While the worst of the financial crisis is behind
us, the [SEC] intensively continues its critical work beyond the Dodd-Frank Act to
fulfill our obligation to protect investors, enhance market stability, and promote
capital formation.”); see also Kulhman et al., supra note 13 (explaining purpose of
Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes Oxley).  Sarbanes Oxley implemented internal protec-
tions to employee who report wrongdoing, particularly to address fraudulent ac-
counting practices. See id. (describing purpose Sarbanes Oxley).  In addition,
Dodd-Frank was established to prohibit retaliation against whistleblower for report-
ing to the SEC fraudulent “conduct potentially detrimental to the financial sys-
tem.” See id. (describing purpose of Dodd-Frank).  For a further discussion of
Sarbanes-Oxley, see infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.  For a further dis-
cussion of Dodd-Frank, see infra notes 48–63 and accompanying text.
32. See What We Do, supra note 30 (detailing SEC’s history).
33. See id. (explaining SEC’s history); see also Fast Answers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml [https://perma.cc/6ZWK-C5KX]
(last modified Oct. 1, 2013) (“[T]he Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives:
[(1)] require that investors receive financial and other significant information
concerning securities being offered for public sale; and [(2)] prohibit deceit, mis-
representations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.”).
34. See What We Do, supra note 30.  The purposes of Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be summarized with respect to two areas:
“[(1)] [c]ompanies publicly offering securities . . . must tell the public the truth
about their businesses, the securities they are selling, and the risks involved in
investing [; and (2)] [p]eople who sell and trade securities . . . must treat investors
fairly and honestly, putting investors’ interests first.” Id.  The SEC identified four
strategic goals and objectives in the its Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2014–2018:
(1) “[e]stablish and maintain an effective regulatory environment[,]” (2) “foster
and enforce compliance with the federal securities laws[,]” (3) “facilitate access to
the information investors need to make informed investment decisions[,]” and
(4) “[e]nhance the [SEC]’s performance through effective alignment and man-
agement of human, information and financial capital[.]” U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
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change Act provided the SEC with discretion to award relatively small pay-
ments for whistleblowers who disclosed information about insider-trading
violations.35  However, whistleblowers were not motivated to disclose infor-
mation partly because of the small financial awards and the SEC’s reluc-
tance in awarding such discretionary payments.36
To assist in its purpose and objectives, the SEC has been afforded
“broad authority to shape the regulatory framework for the securities in-
dustry[,]” including the enforcement of securities laws.37  Accordingly, the
SEC wields “disciplinary powers over regulated entities and persons associ-
ated with them” in order to “identif[y] and prohibit[ ] certain types of
conduct in the markets.”38  As Congress passed additional statutes to assist
in the SEC’s objectives, the agency’s enforcement authority expanded to
include whistleblower programs under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.39
35. See Sarah Johnson, Paid to Whistle, CFO (July 23, 2010), http://ww2.cfo
.com/risk-compliance/2010/07/paid-to-whistle/ [https://perma.cc/4DQW-
745U] (explaining SEC’s discretion to award whistleblower payments before Dodd-
Frank).  “[T]he SEC could reward only whistle-blowers involved in insider-trading
cases” and “has paid out only $159,537 to five claimants.” Id. (explaining history of
SEC’s whistleblower payments).  Previously, whistleblowers were not incentivized
to report wrongdoing. See id. (explaining whistleblowers’ lack of incentives for
reporting wrongdoing).
36. See Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The
Fairytale-Like Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of
“Greedy,” the Eighth Dwarf, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1281–82 (2011) (“[T]he the
SEC has complete discretionary authority over whether to provide the
whistleblower with an award, if at all.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2012))); John-
son, supra note 35 (explaining SEC’s discretion to award whistleblower payments
before Dodd-Frank).
37. See Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2014–2018: Draft for Comment, supra note 34,
at 1–2, 6 (establishing SEC’s mission, vision, and values); see also What We Do, supra
note 30 (stating SEC has authority to enforce securities laws through civil actions).
The SEC recognizes it is its responsibility to:
[(1)] interpret and enforce federal securities laws;
[(2)] issue new rules and amend existing rules;
[(3)] oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers, investment ad-
visers, and ratings agencies;
[(4)] oversee private regulatory organizations in the securities, account-
ing, and auditing fields; and
[(5)] coordinate U.S. securities regulation with federal, state, and for-
eign authorities.
Id.
38. Fast Answers, supra note 33 (explaining SEC’s authority under Exchange
Act).
39. See id. (explaining SEC’s governing laws).  Along with the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act, SEC enforcement and securities laws are also governed by
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and the Jumpstart Our Busi-
ness Startups Act of 2012. See id. (identifying other laws enforced by SEC).
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2. Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are: Sarbanes-Oxley Uncovers
Whistleblower Protection
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the United States witnessed
multiple corporate scandals, such as Enron, Arthur Anderson, and
WorldCom, that left the financial system broken and public confidence
shattered.40  On July 30, 2002, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley to improve
the protection of investors and the financial system in light of recent cor-
porate scandals.41  Sarbanes-Oxley was known as one of the broadest fi-
nancial reforms since the creation of the SEC following Great
Depression.42  For example, Congress was particularly concerned that de-
40. See Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate
Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 880 (2002) (explaining events leading to Enron’s bankruptcy);
Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 357–73 (2003) (describing corporate scan-
dals leading up to enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley).  In October 2001, auditors an-
nounced that Enron’s third quarter losses “[were] potentially misleading and
illegal.” See Baynes, supra, at 880 (quoting Robert Schlesinger, Enron Chief Executive
Lay Resigns, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2002, at A2) (explaining Enron’s corporate scan-
dal).  “In early November [2001], Enron announced that, since 1997, it had over-
stated its earnings by $586 million.” Id. (citing Schlesinger, supra, at A2).  Enron
filed for bankruptcy at the start of December 2011. See id. (citing Schlesinger,
supra, at A2).  Other corporate scandals, including Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Global
Crossing, and WorldCom were influential in passing Sarbanes-Oxley. See Allison
Fass, One Year Later, the Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES (July 22, 2003, 7:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722sarbanes.html [https://perma
.cc/3E8C-7DLJ] (discussing other corporate scandals that occurred prior to pass-
ing Sarbanes-Oxley).  At the time of Enron’s corporate scandal, the company “was
one of the biggest and, it was thought, one of the most financially sound compa-
nies in the U.S.” See Rosemary Peavler, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Enron Scandal—
Why Are They Important?, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/sarbanes-oxley-
act-and-the-enron-scandal-393497 [https://perma.cc/9VKR-8E4P] (last updated
Oct. 18, 2016) (discussing Enron’s corporate scandal and Sarbanes-Oxley’s protec-
tive measures).
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(“[Sarbanes-Oxley is] [a]n Act to protect investors . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2
(“[Sarbanes-Oxley] aims to prevent and punish corporate and criminal fraud, pro-
tect the victims of such fraud, preserve evidence of such fraud, and hold wrongdo-
ers accountable for their actions.”); see also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074,
1081 (2015) (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, all agree, was prompted by the exposure of
Enron’s massive accounting fraud and revelations that the company’s outside audi-
tor, Arthur Anderson LLP, had systematically destroyed potentially incriminating
documents.”); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014) (“To safeguard
investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets following
the collapse of Enron Corporation, Congress enacted [Sarbanes-Oxley].” (citing S.
REP. NO. 107-146, at 2–11)); Peavler, supra note 40 (“The intent of [Sarbanes-
Oxley] was to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corpo-
rate disclosures . . . .”).  Sarbanes-Oxley includes provisions to “strengthen[ ] whis-
tle-blower protections and compliance monitoring.” See Peavler, supra note 40.
42. See Fast Answers, supra note 33 (explaining influence of Sarbanes-Oxley on
financial reforms).  President Bush claimed Sarbanes-Oxley was “[one of] the most
far reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt.”  Id. (quoting President George W. Bush) (emphasizing breadth
of reform under Sarbanes-Oxley); see also Fass, supra note 40 (claiming Sarbanes-
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spite clear evidence of fraud, Enron’s “corporate code of silence” highly
discouraged external and internal reporting.43
In addition to other reforms, Sarbanes-Oxley implemented a
whistleblower program that aimed to prevent publicly traded companies
from retaliating against employees who report suspected violations inter-
nally.44  In the event an employee seeks whistleblower protection under
Sarbanes-Oxley after termination, the employee must follow specific ad-
ministrative procedures before filing suit, such as first filing a claim with
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.45  In addition, under
the applicable statute of limitations, a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower pro-
tection violation complaint must be filed “not later than 180 days after the
date on which the [alleged] violation occurs, or after the date on which
the employee became aware of the violation.”46  In an effort to incentivize
Oxley was one of “the broadest-sweeping legislation to affect corporations . . . since
the 1933 and 1934 securities acts”).
43. See Lawson, 134 S. Ct at 1162 (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2) (2014))
(“Of particular concern to Congress was abundant evidence that Enron had suc-
ceeded in perpetuating its massive shareholder fraud in large part to a ‘corporate
code of silence’; that code, Congress found, ‘discourage[d] employees from re-
porting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities, such as the FBI
and the SEC, but even internally.’” (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO.
107-146, at 4–5)).  Justice Ginsburg opined:
When employees of Enron and its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, at-
tempted to report corporate misconduct, Congress learned, they faced
retaliation, including discharge.  As outside counsel advised company of-
ficials at the time, Enron’s efforts to “quiet” whistleblowers generally were
noted proscribed under then-existing law.  Congress identified the lack of
whistleblower protection as “a significant deficiency” in the law, for in
complex securities fraud investigations, employees “are [often] the only
firsthand witnesses to the fraud.”
Id. at 1162–63 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 107-
146, at 10).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2012) (defining whistleblowers under
Sarbanes-Oxley).  Included within Sarbanes-Oxley were provisions to increase
whistleblower protection and compliance programs. See Peavler, supra note 40
(“[T]he intent of [Sarbanes-Oxley] was to protect investors by improving the accu-
racy and reliability of corporate disclosures . . . .”).
45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b)(1)(A)–(B) (explaining procedural process to
bring claims under Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower program).
A person who alleges discharge or other discrimination by any person in viola-
tion of subsection (a) may seek relief under subsection (c), by—
filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor; or
if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing
of the complaint and there is no showing that such delay is due to the
bad faith of the claimant, bringing an action at law or equity for de non
review in the appropriate district court of the United States, which shall
have jurisdiction over such an action without regarding to the amount in
controversy.
Id.
46. See id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (explaining statute of limitations).
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower program, a successful action may grant an
employee back pay and other compensation.47
3. Got Ghosts? Dodd-Frank Reveals Whistleblower Protection
At the conclusion of 2008, the United States had witnessed a combi-
nation of events, such as the subprime mortgage bubble, that triggered
the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, and the housing
market was at an all-time low.48  On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed
47. See id. § 1514A(c) (stating Sarbanes-Oxley’s remedies for whistleblowers).
In general—An employee prevailing in any action under subsection
(b)(1) shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee
whole.
Compensatory Damages—Relief for any action under paragraph (1) shall
include—
Reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee would
have had, but for the discrimination;
The amount of back pay, with interest; and
Compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the dis-
crimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorney fees.
Id.  For a comparative discussion of the financial incentives and procedures of
Dodd-Frank, see infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
48. See generally Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues
Insurer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/busi-
ness/17insure.html [https://perma.cc/K3AL-GALQ] (explaining Federal Re-
serve’s action to agree to bail out AIG); The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash
Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/school-
sbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article [https://
perma.cc/NKN7-763K] (discussing financial market collapse in 2008).  First, the
U.S. government loaned $85 billion to American International Group (AIG) as
part of what is referred to as a “bailout.” See Andrews et al., supra (explaining AIG’s
bailout).  The Federal Reserve stepped in to bail out AIG “after A.I.G. failed to get
a bank loan to avoid bankruptcy” because the Federal Reserve was concerned that
the financial markets would not survive if the company went bankrupt. See id. (ex-
plaining reason for providing loan to AIG).  Additionally, in taking over Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, the United States took “charge of [two] twin mortgage gi-
ants and the $5 trillion in home loans they back[ed].” See generally David Ellis, U.S.
Seizes Fannie & Freddie, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 2008, 8:28 PM), http://money.cnn
.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fannie_freddie/ [https://perma.cc/2W7Q-
ZSUR] (reporting U.S. government’s takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
This move was one of the U.S. government’s most drastic attempts to repair the
nation’s housing market. See id. (explaining extent of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac takeover).  Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson noted that at the time “a failure
[of Fannie and Freddie] would affect the ability of Americans to get home loans,
auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance . . . [which] would be
harmful to economic growth and job creation.” Id. (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Fur-
ther, Merrill Lynch succumbed to selling its company below market price to Bank
of America in an attempt to save its business. See generally Matthew Karnitschnig et
al., Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB122142278543033525 [https://perma.cc/M2K7-94JZ]
(explaining Bank of America’s deal to buy Merrill Lynch was undervalued).  Bank
of America bought Merrill Lynch for $50 billion, which was about two-thirds of
Merrill Lynch’s value on the stock market a year before the deal was finalized. See
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Dodd-Frank into law to promote financial stability in response to the fi-
nancial crisis.49  Among other reforms, Dodd-Frank implemented a
“[s]ecurities whistleblower incentives and protection” program to en-
courage employees to report potential violations.50  Dodd-Frank accom-
plishes its purpose in two ways: (1) whistleblowers are allowed to bring a
private cause of action to protect themselves from an employer’s anti-retal-
iation actions and (2) the SEC incentivizes individuals for reporting
whistleblower tips that lead to successful enforcement actions.51
id. (explaining Bank of America’s buyout of Merrill Lynch).  Moreover, Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy after it failed to recover from the financial crisis and
could not locate a potential buyer. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bank-
ruptcy; Merrill Iis Sold, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
09/15/business/15lehman.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/29FH-L97J] (explaining
Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy).  Lehman’s bankruptcy was “the largest
failure of an investment bank since the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert 18
years ago.”  Id.  The U.S. government refused to bail out Lehman Brothers. See id.
(explaining collapse of Lehman Brothers).  Further, “[t]he massive fraud perpe-
trated by [Bernie] Madoff through a Ponzi scheme cost investors a tremendous
amount of money and went undetected through failures in SEC exams and investi-
gations.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 137.  The failure of the SEC to detect Madoff’s
fraud had “seriously damaged investor confidence in the effectiveness and compe-
tence of regulators.” See id. (explaining Madoff’s fraudulent activity).  This is par-
tially because the SEC received ample evidence that such fraudulent activity was
occurring. See id. at 137–38 (describing information received by SEC during
Madoff Ponzi scheme and detailing SEC Enforcement inaction during relevant
period).  In addition, during the 2008 market crisis, “[t]housands of Americans
had lost their jobs, watched their savings dwindle, and were forced out of their
homes.” See White, supra note 31 (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law to
address critical issues that triggered the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression.”).
49. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (“[The purpose of Dodd-Frank is] [t]o promote
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and trans-
parency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices, and for other purposes.”); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110–12 (recog-
nizing that role of whistleblower in uncovering Madoff’s Ponzi scheme illustrated
usefulness of whistleblower protection).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (implementing “Securities whistleblower in-
centives and protection” program); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010)
(“The Whistleblower Program aims to motivate those with inside knowledge to
come forward and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons who
have violated securities laws and recover money for victims of financial fraud.”).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (describing how Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower pro-
gram encourages disclosures).  Without protection, whistleblowers may be discour-
aged from reporting due to the fear of being viewed negatively and the possibility
of facing retaliation from their employers. See Frances J. Milliken et al., An Explora-
tory Study of Employee Silence: Issues Tthat Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and
Why, N.Y.U. 12–15 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Milli-
ken.Frances.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QJW-D76X] (illustrating employees face
multiple reasons for not feeling comfortable in reporting concerns); Pellino, supra
note 8, at 913–14 (explaining consequences employees facing that deters them
from reporting violations).  Whistleblowers may submit tips via the SEC’s online
portal or by mailing or faxing their tip. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2015 AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 21
12
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Under Dodd-Frank, an individual must report a violation of a federal
securities law to the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower.52  If an employee
qualifies as a whistleblower, Dodd-Frank articulates three areas of anti-re-
taliation protection.53  Procedurally, in contrast to Sarbanes-Oxley, a
plaintiff may bring a private cause of action directly to courts under Dodd-
Frank.54  In addition, a whistleblower action under Dodd-Frank may be
brought within six to ten years.55
(2015), https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-an
nual-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RT8-N54Y] [hereinafter 2015 ANNUAL
REPORT] (describing whistleblower tip submission process).  Any tip received by
the SEC is evaluated by the SEC’s Office of Market Intelligence to identify those
with high quality information. See id. at 21, 25 (explaining SEC’s evaluation of
whistleblower tips).  Once tips are received, the SEC evaluates information and tips
to determine violations of securities law. See Information for You Before You Submit a
Tip or Complaint to the Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/complaint/info_tipscomplaint.shtml [https://perma.cc/5ZWB-KCV
H] (last modified Oct. 16, 2014) (explaining what happens when tips are submit-
ted). Types of whistleblowers tips include Ponzi schemes, theft of funds or securi-
ties, corporate disclosure and financials, offering fraud, false or misleading
statements, and insider trading. See Enforcement Tips and Complaints, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/complaint/tipscomplaint.shtml [https://per
ma.cc/2A48-M2ER] (last modified Oct. 16, 2014) (describing types of submitted
tips).
52. See id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (defining whistleblower).
53. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (explaining whistleblower protec-
tion under Dodd-Frank).  Under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower is granted retalia-
tion protection in three areas:
(A) In general[—]No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discrimi-
nate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment
because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the [SEC] in accordance with this
section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial
or administrative action of the [SEC] based upon or related to such infor-
mation; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .
Id.  Reading § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) alone would indicate that anti-retaliation pro-
tection is granted to internal reporters, but a previous subsection of Dodd-Frank
defines a whistleblower as an individual who provides information to the SEC. See
id. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii); see also Linda Shen, Courts Continue to Be Divided over
the Scope of Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Protections, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 1
(July 2014), http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/employer_update_july_
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL8J-L9YA] (explaining Dodd-Frank’s definition of
whistleblower applies to § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) anti-retaliation protection).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (“An individual who alleges discharge
or other discrimination in violation of subparagraph (A) may bring an action
under this subsection in the appropriate district court of the United States . . . .”).
55. See id. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)–(II) (stating Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
program’s statute of limitations requirements).
(I) An action under this subsection may not be brought—
(aa) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of subpara-
graph (A) occurred; or
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Dodd-Frank’s incentives for whistleblowers exceed those of Sarbanes-
Oxley.56  Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower bounty program encourages report-
ing of violations of federal securities laws by financially awarding to indi-
viduals whose tips lead to successful enforcement actions.57  Both the
bounty program and Dodd-Frank’s financial incentives are achievable be-
cause both are backed by a $400 million investor protection fund.58  First,
a successful whistleblower claim will result in an award of ten to thirty
percent of the employer’s sanction.59  Second, Dodd-Frank grants double
(bb) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of
action are known or reasonably should have been known by the employee
alleging a violation of subparagraph (A).
(II) Notwithstanding subclause (I), an action under this subsection may
not in any circumstance be brought more than 10 years after the date on
which the violation occurs.
Id.
56. See Kevin B. Leblang & Robert N. Holtzman, Whistleblower Claims Under
SOX & Dodd-Frank: Recent Developments, KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP 3
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/450168/Whistleblow
ing/Whistleblower+Claims+Under+SOX+And+DoddFrank+Recent+Developments
[https://perma.cc/FA6E-PHNU] (comparing incentives of Dodd-Frank to those
of Sarbanes-Oxley).  First, Dodd-Frank grants double back pay, while Sarbanes-
Oxley grants only back pay. See id.  Second, Dodd-Frank “allows whistleblowers to
bring their claims directly in federal court,” while claims under Sarbanes-Oxley
must be filed with the Department of Labor first. See id.  (comparing Dodd-Frank’s
procedural requirements to those of Sarbanes-Oxley).  Third, Dodd-Frank pro-
vides a longer statute of limitation than Sarbanes-Oxley. See id.  (comparing stat-
utes’ respective limitations periods).  Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, the Dodd-Frank
bounty program is “backed by a $450 million Investor Protection Fund, from
which the SEC can make awards ranging from 10 to 30 percent of the monetary
sanctions collected in a successful enforcement action, provided the sanctions ex-
ceed $1 million.” Shen, supra note 53, at 4 (illustrating differences in financial
incentives and procedural requirements under Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley).
For a further discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower incentives, see supra
notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
57. See Kathleen L. Casey, Adoption of Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (May 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511klc-
item2.htm [https://perma.cc/5UNH-5GFC] (recognizing whistleblower bounty
program was created for “prevention, timely detection, and effective enforcement
of securities law violations”).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(2) (stating whistleblower award payment “shall
be paid from the [SEC Investor Protection Fund]”); see also Shen, supra note 53 at
3–4 (explaining Dodd-Frank’s financial incentives and remedies).  The Investor
Protection Fund was established in order to ensure payment would be made to
eligible whistleblowers. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 4 (explaining
Dodd-Frank’s bounty program).  At the end of the 2015 fiscal year, the Investor
Protection Fund had $400,693,089.56 available to assist in awarding payments to
whistleblowers and financing the SEC’s whistleblower program’s operations. See id.
at 27 (reporting amount in Investment Protection Fund).
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(b)(1)(A)–(B) (stating general awards granted to
whistleblowers).
(1) In any [judicial or administrative action brought by the [SEC] under
the securities laws that results in monetary sanctions exceeding
$1,000,000], the [SEC] . . . shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more
14
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back pay for a successful action.60  Since Dodd-Frank’s inception, tip rates
and financial awards for alleged violations have increased.61  With the in-
whistleblowers . . . [who] led to the successful enforcement of the covered
judicial or administrative action . . . in an aggregate amount equal to—
(A) not less than 10 percent, of what has been collected of the monetary
sanctions imposed in the action or related actions; and
(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the
monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions.
Id.
60. See id. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (stating relief granted to prevailing
whistleblower’s cause of action).
(C(C)) Relief for an individual prevailing in action under subparagraph
(B) shall include—
(i) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the individual would
have had, but for the discrimination;
(ii) 2 times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the individual,
with interest; and
(iii) compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasona-
ble attorneys’ fees.
Id.
61. See generally 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 21 (“For each year that
the whistleblower program has been in operation, the [SEC] has received an in-
creasing number of whistleblower tips.  Since August 2011, the [SEC] has received
a total of 14,116 whistleblower tips, and in Fiscal Year 2015 alone, received almost
4,000 [tips].”).  In addition, the SEC “has paid more than $54 million to 22
whistleblowers since the [SEC]’s new whistleblowers went into effect in August
2011.” Id.  Of the fourteen whistleblower awards issued up to and during 2014,
nine were issued in 2014. See generally Pamela L. Johnston et al., A Review of Recent
Whistleblower Developments, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.foley
.com/a-review-of-recent-whistleblower-developments-01-05-2015/ [https://perma
.cc/JU5R-MLYY] (analyzing whistleblower awards under Dodd-Frank).
 In 2015, the SEC’s annual report to Congress recorded 3,923 tips, an increase
of eight percent from 2014 and a thirty-percent increase since the program’s first
full year in 2012. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 21; see also Lisa M.
Noller et al., A Review of Recent Whistleblower Developments, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.foley.com/a-review-of-recent-whistleblower-develop-
ments-01-07-2016/ [https://perma.cc/W943-4JX3] (analyzing SEC’s 2015 annual
report to Congress on Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program).  In comparison, the
SEC’s 2014 annual report recorded 3,620 tips, which was an increase of twelve
percent from 2013. See id. (reporting SEC’s recorded Dodd-Frank whistleblower
tips in 2014).  In the 2015 fiscal year alone, the SEC paid more than $37 million to
whistleblowers, including a $30 million award announced in September 2014, the
highest award to date. See id. (reporting payments to Dodd-Frank whistleblower’s
in 2015).  Additional awards in 2015 included: (1) a $600,000 award in an anti-
retaliation case, (2) over million dollars to a compliance professional, (3) over $30
million award to a whistleblower, which was the third-largest whistleblower award
in history, (4) a half-million dollar award to a former company officer, and (5) a
$325,000 award to a whistleblower. See generally 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
51, at 10–12 (reporting awards made under Dodd-Frank in 2015).  Further, in
2016, the SEC’s total “awards to whistleblowers . . . surpassed the $100 million
mark[,]” with over $57 million coming from 2016 only, including “[s]ix of the ten
highest awards [ever].” See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2016),
https://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annual-report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB48-
BV98] [hereinafter 2016 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
awards in 2016).  Similar to 2015, the amount of tips in 2016 increased by more
15
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crease in awards, employers are concerned that employees may be report-
ing suspected violations for a large payday, regardless of how far-fetched a
tip may seem.62  Further, the financial payments awarded and
whistleblower-friendly procedures afforded to individuals under Dodd-
Frank are greater than those granted under Sarbanes-Oxley.63
B. Strange Noises in the Law: Interpretations of Sarbanes-Oxley
and Dodd-Frank
A new class of cases is appearing in courts tasked with interpreting the
breadth of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections.64  These cases result
from internal whistleblowers alleging more violations under Dodd-Frank
because of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-friendly procedures and financial
incentives.65  Because of the increase in the number of cases under Dodd-
Frank, a growing issue presented to courts is whether whistleblowers who
internally report suspected violations are protected under Dodd-Frank,
than 40%, totaling over 4200 tips. See generally id. (recording number of
whistleblower tips in 2016).
62. See Johnson, supra note 35 (“For employers, the changes could bring on
heartburn.”).  While Dodd-Frank may expand whistleblower protection, it has also
concerned employers about employees who may make “farfetched” claims for the
possibility of a “lucrative payday.” See id. (noting employers’ concerns).
63. See Shen, supra note 53, at 3–4 (stating “Dodd-Frank provides significantly
greater remedies for retaliation, and also offers significantly greater financial in-
centives” than Sarbanes-Oxley).  Whistleblowers may receive double the amount of
back pay under Dodd-Frank than Sarbanes-Oxley offers. See id.  (evaluating em-
ployment remedies under Dodd-Frank compared to Sarbanes-Oxley).  In addition
to back pay, Dodd-Frank provides monetary awards ranging from ten to thirty per-
cent of the money sanctions for successful enforcement actions. See id. (noting
significant financial awards under Dodd-Frank).  A whistleblower under Dodd-
Frank may bring his or her private claims directly to court. See id. (illustrating
procedural incentives under Dodd-Frank).  Moreover, Dodd-Frank provides a
longer statute of limitations than Sarbanes-Oxley. See id. (identifying statute of
limitations advantage under Dodd-Frank).
64. See id. (noting extension of Dodd-Frank to include internal reporters cre-
ates “a more powerful cause of action than what is available under Sarbanes-
Oxley”).  This “powerful cause of action” is due to the more beneficial financial
incentives under Dodd-Frank as compared to Sarbanes-Oxley, including back pay,
monetary awards, statute of limitations, and filing requirements. See id. (explain-
ing impact of Dodd-Frank’s financial incentives on future claims).  For a further
discussion of the comparison of the financial incentives and procedural benefits
between Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley, see supra notes 53–64 and accompany-
ing text.
65. See id. at 4 (“[The] plaintiff-friendly aspects of Dodd-Frank may in turn
affect the frequency with which employees file whistleblower retaliation
claims . . . .”); see also Jyotin Hamid et al., Client Update Recent Decisions Create Further
Uncertainty on Question of Whether Internal Reporting Triggers Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Anti-Retaliation Protection, N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, Mar. 11, 2016 (explaining increase
of whistleblower complaints under Dodd-Frank has grown concern among private
litigants).  The uncertainty in the law will continue to increase SEC and litigant
complaints for the foreseeable future. See id. (explaining impact on future
complaints).
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which normally protects those who report directly to the SEC.66  As courts
and the SEC attempt to address the issue, an expanding split among dis-
trict and circuit courts has left employees confused about who they should
call for protection.67
1. I Ain’t Afraid of No Whistleblowers: The SEC Answers the Call
With an increasing number of court cases, the SEC attempted to clar-
ify the issue of whether Dodd-Frank grants internal whistleblowers protec-
tion in addition to Sarbanes-Oxley’s protection.68  In May 2011, the SEC
issued Rule 21F-2(b) to state expressly that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
program applies both to employees who externally and employees who
internally report alleged violations.69  Specifically, the SEC opined that re-
taliation protection under § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) had an independent mean-
ing compared to the definition of whistleblower under § 78u-6(a)(6).70
On August 4, 2015, the SEC again attempted to clarify its understanding of
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection.71  The SEC reiterated that an indi-
66. For a further discussion of courts addressing the issue in Berman, see supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
67. For a further discussion of the growing split between courts, see infra
notes 76–94 and accompanying text.
68. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a) (2016) (clarifying definition of “whistle-
blower” under Dodd-Frank).  The SEC found a whistleblower received protection
when:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are provid-
ing relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a
possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in Section
21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).
Id. §§ 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
69. See Securities Whistleblowers Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg.
34,300, 34,304 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249) (inter-
preting Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision to “apply to three different catego-
ries of whistleblowers, and the third category includes individuals who report to
persons or governmental authorities other than the [SEC]”).  The SEC interpreted
Dodd-Frank to include two definitions of whistleblowers. See id. at 34,363 (explain-
ing SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank).  First, the definition of a whistleblower is
“if, alone or jointly with others, you provide the [SEC] with information . . . and
the information relates to a possible violation of the Federal securities laws.”  Id.
Second, “[f]or the purposes of the anti-retaliation protection . . .  [an individual is]
a whistleblower if . . . [the individual] provide[d] that information in a manner
described in” § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).”  Id.  “Specifically, Section 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii) . . .
incorporate[s] the anti-retaliation protections specified in Section 806 of
[Sarbanes-Oxley] . . . [which occurs] when . . . employees report to . . . a person
with supervisory authority over the employee.” Id. at 34,304.
70. See Shen, supra note 53, at 2 (explaining SEC’s release contended that
anti-retaliation has independent meaning that protects whistleblowers who report
internally).
71. See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under Section 21F,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-75592, 2015 WL 4624264 (Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter
Exchange Act Release No. 34-75592] (issuing release to clarify that qualifying as
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank includes individuals who internally report); SEC
17
Mickles: If There's Something Strange in Your Workplace, Who Ya Gonna Call
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
374 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 357
vidual who internally reports suspected wrongdoing should be granted
whistleblower protection under Dodd-Frank.72  In support of its opinion,
the SEC claimed that this decision best comports with the overall goals of
implementing the whistleblower program and encourages individuals to
report internally.73  In an attempt to advocate for its opinion, the SEC has
filed amicus briefs in district and circuit court cases attempting to per-
suade courts to accept the SEC’s interpretation.74  The SEC’s recent ef-
forts reflect its initiative to encourage employees to report violations to
their employers.75
Issues Interpretation Regarding Definition of “Whistleblower” Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Anti-Retaliation Provision, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP 1 (Aug. 27, 2015),
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/firmmemo_08_27_15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9GS-QJX4] (describing SEC’s second release explaining un-
derstanding of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection).
72. See Exchange Release No. 34-75592, supra note 71, at *3 (opining that
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank has two definitions); Leblang & Holtzman, supra
note 56, at 2 (“The SEC declared . . . that for purposes of the employment retalia-
tion protections provided by Dodd-Frank, an individual’s status as a whistleblower
does not depend on whether or not he or she reported wrongdoing to the SEC.”).
73. See Exchange Release No. 34-75592, supra note 71, at *3 (“[B]y providing
employment retaliation protections for individuals who report internally first . . .
our interpretative rule avoids a two-tiered structure of employment retaliation pro-
tection that might discourage some individuals from first reporting internally . . .
and, thus, jeopardize the investor-protection and law-enforcement benefits that
can result from internal reporting.”).  Accordingly, internal and external reporters
will receive the same protection. See id. (explaining basis for interpretation).
74. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 2 (discussing SEC’s amicus
briefs requesting federal courts to defer to its opinion).  Such amicus briefs have
been filed within the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits. See, e.g., Danon v. Van-
guard Grp., Inc., Civil Action No. 15-6864, 2016 WL 2988987, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Pa.
May 23, 2016) (“The SEC submitted a brief advocating that the anti-retaliation
provisions in Dodd-Frank allow anti-retaliation whistleblower protections under
Dodd-Frank to apply to a putative whistleblower who reports securities fraud viola-
tions internally . . . .”), appeal filed, No. 16-2881 (3d Cir. June 22, 2016); Verble v.
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 654 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
(discussing SEC attempts to convince court to adopt interpretation of Dodd-Frank
to include protection of internal reporters), aff’d, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040
(6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), petition for cert. denied, No. 16-946, 2017 WL 434012 (U.S.
Mar. 20, 2017).
 In Verble, the SEC filed an amicus brief advocating for the adoption of the
Second Circuit’s decision in Berman where the court accepted the SEC’s interpreta-
tion of whistleblower. See generally Lisa M. Noller et al., SEC Continues to File Amicus
Briefs in Support of Its Definition of “Whistleblower”, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 12, 2016), http://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1a7cb7f1-90b8-402c-888a-4541f132d179
[https://perma.cc/5HUK-MPZV] (reviewing recent case developments on subject
of whistleblowers).  Similarly, in Danon, the SEC filed an amicus brief arguing that
the plaintiff’s “internal complaints qualified for whistleblower protection under
the anti-retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.”  Id. (explaining basis for
SEC’s amicus brief).
75. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 2 (advocating SEC’s initiative
in “want[ing] whistleblowers—and their employers—to know that employees are
free to come forward without fear of reprisals” (quoting Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Ray Garrett, Jr. Corporate and Securities
Law Institute, Northwestern University School of Law (Apr. 30, 2015))).
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2. Federal Courts Remain Spooked: Confusion Between the Circuits
Although the SEC has attempted to address this issue, district and
circuit courts have remained uncertain as to whether Dodd-Frank grants
retaliation protection to employees who internally report suspected
wrongdoing.76  On one hand, district courts in the First, Second, Third,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have found the tension between
Dodd-Frank’s provisions ambiguous enough to apply the framework ar-
ticulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.77
(known as Chevron deference).78  Under Chevron deference’s two-step anal-
ysis, the court must determine if Congress has “directly spoken to” the
issue, and if so, then the court follows Congress’s “expressed intent.”79  If
not, a court may defer to the reasonable interpretation of the agency over-
seeing the statute.80  Specifically, these courts found tension between
Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower under § 78u-6(a)(6) and § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii) because § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) refers to Sarbanes-Oxley,
which protects individuals who internally report suspected wrongdoing
but do not report to the SEC.81  Accordingly, district courts generally find
Dodd-Frank ambiguous, apply Chevron deference to the SEC’s opinion,
and conclude that the SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
76. For a further discussion of courts addressing the issue in Berman, see supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
77. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
78. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015) (refer-
ring to cases in favor of applying Chevron deference); Lamb v. Rockwell Automa-
tion Inc., Case No. 15-CV-1415-JPS, 2016 WL 4273210, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12,
2016) (referencing circuits in favor of Berman); Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith
Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 652 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (collecting cases on both
sides of issue), aff’d, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), petition
for cert. denied, No. 16-946, 2017 WL 434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).  For a further
discussion of courts applying Chevron deference, see supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
79. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“First, always, is the question [of] whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
80. See id. at 843 (“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction of the statute . . . .  Rather . . . the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” (foot-
note omitted)); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1097 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (explaining Chevron deference), aff’d, No. 15-17352, 2017 WL 908245
(9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).
81. See Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755–56 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (not-
ing arguments for expanding Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection).  District
courts finding Dodd-Frank to be ambiguous did so on three grounds: (1) that
expanding Dodd-Frank complies with the statute’s purpose, (2) that § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii) would be limited in scope if Dodd-Frank were not expanded, and
(3)  that the SEC had opined that whistleblowers may report violations internally
to receive protection under Dodd-Frank. See id. (describing three bases for district
courts’ conclusion that Dodd-Frank is ambiguous regarding whistleblower
protection).
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protection provision, an interpretation that incorporates Sarbanes-Oxley’s
whistleblower protection provision into Dodd-Frank, is reasonable.82
However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed and instead found the definition
of whistleblower unambiguous and controlling; accordingly, the SEC’s in-
terpretation was not owed Chevron deference.83  In Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), L.L.C.,84 the Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court to address the
issue of whether Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection extends to indi-
viduals who report suspected violations to their employers.85  In Asadi, the
plaintiff alleged that his employer violated Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
protection provision by terminating him after he internally reported sus-
pected violations of securities law.86  The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
SEC’s interpretation of the statute but refused to apply it, noting that the
SEC does not have the authority to extend Dodd-Frank’s reach.87  Instead,
the court found that the definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank
expressly protects employees who externally report suspected violations to
the SEC.88  In reaching its holding, the Fifth Circuit highlighted that the
three categories listed in the anti-retaliation provision merely represent
protected activities, rather than define a whistleblower under Dodd-
Frank.89  More precisely, individuals who qualified under the definition of
82. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 153 (comparing cases favoring application of Chev-
ron deference).
83. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013)
(concluding Chevron deference was inapplicable).  The Fifth Circuit stated that
“there is only one category of whistleblowers: individuals who provide information
relating to a securities law violation to the SEC.”  Id. at 625.
84. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
85. See Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (noting Fifth Circuit in Asadi was first
circuit court to address split among multiple federal courts).
86. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 621 (describing facts of case).  Asadi was an em-
ployee of G.E. Energy, where he became “concerned [his employer’s] alleged con-
duct violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” See id.  After Asadi reported the
issue to his supervisor, Asadi received poor performance reviews and was pressured
to accept a different position. See id.  Asadi claimed he was terminated once he
refused to “accept a reduced role in the [company].” See id.  He “concede[d] that
he [was] not a ‘whistleblower’ as that term is defined in § 78u-6(a)(6),” but con-
tended that he should be covered under the anti-retaliation provision of § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii). See id. at 624 (detailing plaintiff’s primary contention).
87. See id. at 629–30 (refusing to extend Dodd-Frank’s statutory reach despite
SEC’s interpretation).  The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the SEC’s opinion but
found that Congress had clearly shown its intent by defining whistleblower in
the statute. See id. (“Congress defined ‘whistleblower’ . . . and did so
unambiguously.”).
88. See id. at 623 (“[T]he plain language of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-
protection provision creates a private cause of action only for individuals who pro-
vide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.”).  Thus,
the Fifth Circuit found Asadi was not a whistleblower because he did not disclosure
his suspicions to the SEC. See id.  The Fifth Circuit “held that providing informa-
tion to the SEC was a prerequisite to Dodd-Frank whistleblower protection.” Shen,
supra note 53, at 2 (explaining Fifth Circuit’s holding).
89. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627 (finding Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions
do “not provide alternative definitions of the term ‘whistleblowers’”).
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whistleblower are protected, but only if they engage in any of the three
activities in the anti-retaliation provision.90
In agreement with Asadi, multiple district courts in the Second, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have found Dodd-Frank’s definition of
whistleblower to be unambiguous, and therefore, the SEC’s interpretation
of the statute undeserving of Chevron deference.91  Notably, these courts
emphasized that it is not the responsibility of the courts to expand the
statute’s definition to obtain a particularly desired result.92  In further sup-
port, courts have indicated an internal reporter’s protection claim may
still be viable under Sarbanes-Oxley, even if not available under Dodd-
Frank.93  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit’s decision in Berman officially
created a circuit split and continued the confusion among employees.94
III. GHOST OF WHISTLEBLOWERS PRESENT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT CREATES
A CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN BERMAN
In granting review of Berman’s appeal, the Second Circuit was tasked
with deciding whether employees are entitled to retaliation protection
90. See id. at 626 (noting “Congress [ ] used the term ‘whistleblower’ through-
out subsection (h)” before Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision).
91. See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (E.D. Wis.
2014) (“There is no ambiguity in [Dodd-Frank] at all . . . .”); see also Lamb v.
Rockwell Automation Inc., Case No. 15-CV-1415-JPS, 2016 WL 4273210, at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Aug. 12, 2016) (discussing circuits in favor of Asadi); Verble v. Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 652 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (collecting cases
on each side of issue), aff’d, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017),
petition for cert. denied, No. 16-946, 2017 WL 434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017); Hamid et
al., supra note 65 (discussing district courts’ findings after Berman).  In Lamb, a
recent case to address the issue, the district court found that the plaintiff was not a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank because, although she submitted a complaint to
the SEC, the plaintiff filed the complaint after she reported alleged wrongdoing
internally and was terminated. See Lamb, 2016 WL 4273210, at *4 (explaining rea-
soning and holding of case).  For a further discussion of district courts applying
the Fifth Circuit’s rationale, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
92. See Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL
2619501, at *9 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (urging courts are not responsible “to
second guess the reasoning or providence of unambiguous statutory language or
expand explicit definitions within a statute to reach a desired result”); see also Verfu-
erth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (“[E]ven if the statute produces a somewhat confusing
public policy outcome . . . that does not mean there is any ambiguity in the statute
itself.”).
93. See Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[Dodd-
Frank] is not the only protection available to individuals who believe they are be-
ing retaliated against for revealing securities fraud.  These plaintiffs have other
options.”); see also Andrew Walker, Note, Why Shouldn’t We Protect Internal
Whistleblowers? Exploring Justifications for the Asadi Decision, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761,
1775–76 (2015) (explaining Sarbanes-Oxley grants protection to internal
whistleblowers outside of Dodd-Frank).
94. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (provid-
ing court’s analysis); see also Bryan F. DuBon, BNA Insights: The Sound of Uncer-
tainty—Whistle-Blowers and the SEC, SEC. L. DAILY, Apr. 25, 2016, at 1, 3 (noting
future circuit courts may be addressing this issue).
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under Dodd-Frank if the employees report wrongdoing to their employers
rather than the SEC.95  In Berman, the majority answered that the plaintiff
was entitled to retaliation protection under Dodd-Frank, even though he
only internally reported the suspected wrongdoing.96  Accordingly, the
Second Circuit’s approach differed from that of the Fifth Circuit, officially
creating a circuit split and furthering the existing confusion surrounding
whistleblower protection.97  In effect, the majority’s decision to expand
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition has made Sarbanes-Oxley’s
whistleblower program irrelevant because future plaintiffs are more likely
to use Dodd-Frank due to its plaintiff-friendly incentives, even if they do
not satisfy the legislature’s statutory definition of whistleblower
definition.98
A. If There’s Something Weird and It Don’t Look Good:
Facts and Procedure in Berman
Daniel Berman (Berman) was a finance director for Neo@Ogilvy LLC
(Neo) and its parent company, WPP Group USA, Inc. (WPP), “from Octo-
ber 2010 to April 2013,” when he was terminated.99  As Neo’s finance di-
rector, Berman was “responsible for Neo’s financial reporting and its
compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles [(GAAP)].”100
In addition, Berman was responsible for “internal accounting procedures
of Neo and its parent[,]” WPP.101  While working for Neo, Berman
95. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 147 (stating issue before Second Circuit).  More
precisely, the issue was “whether an employee who suffers retaliation because he
reports wrongdoing internally, but not to the SEC, can obtain the retaliation reme-
dies provided by Dodd-Frank.” Id.
96. See id. at 155 (holding Berman should be granted retaliation protection
under Dodd-Frank for reporting wrongdoing to employer).
97. See id.
98. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 2013)
(reasoning that extending Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection would “render
the [Sarbanes-Oxley] anti-retaliation provision, for practical purposes, moot”); see
also Jason Zuckerman et al., SOX Whistleblower Protections Are Not Obsolete, LAW360
(Sept. 21, 2015, 10:45 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/704629/sox-whistle
blower-protections-are-not-obsolete [https://perma.cc/EQ8B-ZWX2] (“Dodd-
Frank is ostensibly a better remedy than SOX because Dodd-Frank authorizes
double back pay and enables whistleblowers to bring their claims directly to fed-
eral court without having to exhaust administrative remedies to OSHA.”).
99. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 148–49 (describing Berman’s relationship to Neo).
“Neo is a media agency that provides a range of digital and direct media services.”
Id. at 149; see also Defs.’ Br. at 11, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4626), 2015 WL 1156544, at *5 (describing Neo’s business and
services it provides).  “WPP Group USA, Inc. is a nonpublic indirect parent of
Neo.” Id.
100. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 148–49 (describing Berman’s responsibilities as
finance director for Neo and WPP); see also Pl.’s Compl. at 3, Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14CV00523), 2014 WL
11307732 (explaining Berman’s job responsibilities).
101. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 148–49 (“[Berman] was responsible for Neo’s
financial reporting and its compliance with . . . [GAAP], as well as internal account
22
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claimed he noticed fraudulent accounting practices that violated the
GAAP, WPP policies, Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and U.S. securities
law.102  Specifically, Berman’s alleged suspicions of Neo and WPP’s con-
duct included delayed media payments, “improperly recognizing reve-
nues,” “ ‘reversed’ accounting reserves,” and “favorable and ‘lenient’
payment terms.”103  Rather than directly reporting these suspected viola-
tions to the SEC, Berman internally reported them to his employer.104  In
April 2013, one of Neo’s senior officers terminated Berman.105  Six
months after his termination in October 2013, Berman reported Neo’s
suspected violations to the SEC for the first time.106
On January 28, 2014, Berman filed an action in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York against Neo and WPP, alleging a
retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank.107  Berman claimed his termination
procedures of Neo and its parent . . . [WPP].”); see also Pl.’s Compl., supra note
100, at 3 (“In [Berman’s] capacity of Finance Director, [he] was responsible for
the accuracy of Neo’s financial reporting, and Neo’s compliance with GAAP, and
for compliance with WPP’s accounting policies.”).
102. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 149 (explaining case’s factual background); see
also Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 4 (describing Berman’s claim).
103. See Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 5–7 (explaining Berman’s suspected
violations of securities law); Defs.’ Br., supra note 99, at 7 (explaining Berman’s
claim).  First, Berman alleged delayed media payments occurred when Neo pur-
chased advertisement for its clients but delayed payments to the advertising com-
panies in order to hold onto clients’ capital for Neo’s own purposes. See Defs.’ Br.,
supra note 99, at 6–7 (describing Berman’s claims).  Second, Berman alleged a
Neo executive improperly and fraudulently recognized revenue that was not yet
permitted under GAAP and WPP policies. See id. (explaining Berman’s allega-
tions).  Additionally, Berman contended a Neo executive “attempt[ed] to execute
certain accounting transactions that would improperly and fraudulently ‘reverse’
accounting reserves directly into Neo’s profits.”  Id.  Lastly, Berman contended
that “a senior level executive attempted to obtain favorable and ‘lenient’ payment
terms for a client with whom he ha[d] a personal relationship.”  Id.
104. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 149 (explaining case’s factual background); see
also Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 8 (explaining Berman’s alleged violations of
securities law); Defs.’ Br., supra note 99, at 8 (describing Berman’s claim).
105. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 149 (“A senior officer at Neo became angry with
him, and he was terminated as a resulting of his whistleblower activities in April
2013.”); see also Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 7 (claiming Berman’s termination
was retaliation against him for uncovering “improper and fraudulent” practices);
Defs.’ Br., supra note 99, at 8–9 (contending Berman did not notify Neo or WPP of
improper practices until after Berman was terminated).  Berman claimed he at-
tempted to report Neo’s and WPP’s fraudulent matters in accordance with his job
duties, Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley WPP policies, and federal securities laws
before he was terminated. See Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 7–8 (explaining
events leading up to Berman’s termination).
106. See Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 9 (“On October 31, 2013, [Berman]
reported to the [SEC] . . . WPP’s and Neo’s violations of U.S. Securities Laws.”) see
also Berman, 801 F.3d at 149 (stating that Berman’s statute of limitations for his
Sarbanes-Oxley’s claim ran before he filed his SEC whistleblower claim).
107. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(describing Berman’s allegations “that his employers’ actions in response to his
reporting violated the whistleblower protection provision of [Dodd-Frank]”).
Berman claimed his actions were protected by Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley, fed-
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occurred in retaliation of his whistleblower actions and directly violated
protections afforded to him under Dodd-Frank.108  In response, Neo and
WPP filed a motion to dismiss Berman’s claim, arguing Berman was not a
protected whistleblower under Dodd-Frank because he did not report his
suspected violations to the SEC.109
On December 8, 2014, the district court held that Berman did not
qualify as a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank and dismissed the case.110
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision,
reversed and remanded the district court’s decision for further proceed-
ings.111  Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit found Berman was a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank and was entitled to retaliation protec-
tion.112  The matter was remanded to the district court after Neo and WPP
decided not to file a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.113  Neverthe-
eral securities laws, and WPP policies. See Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 7 (listing
Berman’s protections for his activities).
108. See Pl.’s Compl., supra note 100, at 7 (claiming Berman “is a ‘whistle-
blower’ within the meaning of Dodd Frank”).  Berman further claimed he was
protected under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision even if he did not meet
the definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank. See id. (providing further
whistleblower protection claims).
109. See Berman, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 406 (“[Neo and WPP] argued that
[Berman] was not a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank at the time of the alleged
retaliation because he had not reported any violations to the [SEC].”).
110. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 146 (denying magistrate judge’s recommendation
and finding Berman did not qualify under Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition).
Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn, to whom the motion to dismiss was referred,
found Berman qualified as a whistleblower “because of the retaliation protection
of subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(A)(1), unrestricted by the definition of
‘whistleblower’ in subsection 21F(a)(6)[,]” thereby entitling him to Dodd-Frank
protection against retaliation actions from his employer. See id. at 149 (explaining
procedural history).  Nonetheless, Judge Netburn recommended that the motion
be granted because of legal insufficiencies. See id. (detailing procedural history);
Berman, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 406 (providing procedural history).
111. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 146 (reversing and remanding district court’s
judgment).  The majority decision noted on remand that the district court may
“consider the [Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation] to dismiss, with-
out prejudice to amendment, for lack of a sufficient allegation of a termination
entitled to Dodd-Frank protection, and any other arguments made by the Defend-
ants in support of their motion to dismiss.”  Id. at 155.
112. See id. at 146 (granting Berman whistleblower protection under Dodd-
Frank).
113. See Noller et al., supra note 61, at 2 (explaining procedure after Second
Circuit’s decision).
On October 14, 2015, the Second Circuit stayed the issuance of its man-
date to allow the United States Supreme Court to decide whether it
would take up the issue.  However, on November 10, 2015, the defend-
ants in the matter advised the Second Circuit that they would not be pur-
suing a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  Thus, the matter [was]
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Id. (explaining procedural posture of case).  Neo and WPP’s decision not to seek
review by the Supreme Court has “re-invigorated the debate over whether Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation protections cover individuals who report to their employ-
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less, on remand, the district court dismissed Berman’s complaint due to
legal insufficiencies in his claims.114
B. How May I Direct Your Call?: The Second Circuit Broadens Dodd-Frank’s
Whistleblower Protection
The Second Circuit’s decision to grant Berman retaliation protection
under Dodd-Frank for his internal whistleblower reports amplified the
pre-existing tension between the courts by officially creating a circuit split
with the Fifth Circuit.115  In particular, the majority relied on precedent
that found Dodd-Frank ambiguous and applied Chevron deference.116
The dissent, however, looked to the Fifth Circuit’s precedent in reasoning
that Berman did not qualify as a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank.117
1. Who Can Ya Call?: The Majority Calls for the SEC’s Interpretation
The Second Circuit analyzed four areas in rejecting the district
court’s holding and denying Neo and WPP’s motion to dismiss.118  First,
the court analyzed whether the two Dodd-Frank sections at issue con-
flicted with each other.119  Second, the court reviewed the legislative his-
tory of Dodd-Frank.120  Third, the court reviewed past precedent on the
issue within district and circuit courts.121  Lastly, the court conducted a
textual analysis of Dodd-Frank.122  After reviewing these areas, the Second
Circuit held that the Dodd-Frank sections at issue were sufficiently ambig-
ers, as opposed to contacting the [SEC].” See Baker & Flinn, supra note 20 (ex-
plaining impact of defendants’ decision not to seek Supreme Court review).
114. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-cv-523-GHW-SN, 2016 WL
815158, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016) (explaining court’s decision in dismissing
Berman’s complaint and granting time for Berman to amend complaint to resolve
its legal insufficiencies).
115. See id. at 153 (noting that “although our decision creates a circuit split, it
does so against a landscape of existing disagreement among a large number of
district courts”).
116. See id. at 155 (applying Chevron deference to Berman’s case).
117. See id. at 160 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (contending Asadi decision should
apply to case).
118. For a further discussion of the majority’s analysis, see infra notes 119–42
and accompanying text.
119. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 152 (explaining conflict between § 78u-6(a)(6)
and § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)).  For a further discussion of the majority’s analysis of
the conflict between Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley, see infra notes 124–36 and
accompanying text.
120. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 152 (explaining Dodd-Frank’s legislative history).
For a further discussion of the majority’s review of the legislative history of Dodd-
Frank, see infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
121. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 153 (discussing relevant case law).  For a further
discussion of the majority’s review of the applicable precedent, see infra notes
131–34 and accompanying text.
122. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (analyzing text of Dodd-Frank sections at
issue).  For a further discussion of the majority’s textual analysis, see infra notes
135–39 and accompanying text.
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uous to warrant Chevron deference to the SEC, thereby granting retaliation
protection to Berman under Dodd-Frank.123
First, the court found no direct conflict between the definition of
whistleblower in § 78u-6(a)(6) and the lack of a notification requirement
in either § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) or Sarbanes-Oxley, allowing for simultaneous
reporting.124  Simultaneous reporting occurs when employees report sus-
pected allegations both to their employer and the SEC.125  As such, a si-
multaneous reporting scenario could allow for protection under both
acts.126  Nevertheless, even though the majority opined that simultaneous
reporting would avoid a conflict between Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower defi-
nition and the Sarbanes-Oxley’s protection granted under § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii), the Second Circuit claimed such a scenario would be
limited.127
Second, in determining whether Dodd-Frank granted protection to
internal reporters, the Second Circuit reviewed Dodd-Frank’s legislative
history in an attempt to uncover Congress’s intent in adding Subdivision
(iii).128  However, the court’s attempt to review the legislative history did
not reveal any beneficial information because Subdivision (iii) was not
123. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (“[W]e need not resolve the ambiguity our-
selves, but will defer to the reasonable interpretive rule adopted by the appropriate
agency.”).
124. See id. at 150–51 (“In our case there is no absolute conflict between the
[SEC] notification requirement in the definition of ‘whistleblower’ and the ab-
sence of such a requirement in both [§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)] of Dodd-Frank and
the Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions incorporated by subdivision (iii).”).
125. See id. (“An employee who suffers retaliation after reporting wrongdoing
simultaneously to his employer and to the SEC is eligible for Dodd-Frank remedies
and those provided by Sarbanes-Oxley.”).
126. See id. (illustrating § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) of Dodd-Frank would grant
Berman “remedies, and his simultaneous report to the SEC assures him that he will
not have excluded himself from Dodd-Frank remedies”).
127. See id. (finding simultaneous reporting would leave Subdivision (iii)
“with an extremely limited scope”).  In support of its finding, the court stated that
such scenarios would be “few in number” and some jobs would not even allow for
simultaneous reporting, such as auditors and attorneys. See id. at 151 (explaining
court’s reasoning).  For auditors, “if subdivision (iii) requires reporting to the
[SEC], its express cross-reference to . . . Sarbanes-Oxley would afford [ ] auditors
almost no Dodd-Frank protection for retaliation because [ ] auditors must await a
company response to internal reporting before reporting to the [SEC], and any
retaliation would almost always precede [SEC] reporting.”  Id. at 151.  Similarly,
“[l]ike auditors, attorneys would gain little, if any, Dodd-Frank protection if subdi-
vision (iii), despite cross-referencing Sarbanes-Oxley provisions protecting lawyers,
protected only against retaliation for reporting to the [SEC].”  Id. at 152.
128. See id. at 152 (reviewing legislative history of Subdivision (iii) in Dodd-
Frank).  The majority stated that the court “would normally look to the legislative
history of subdivision (iii) to learn what Congress . . . had sought to accomplish by
adding subdivision (iii).”  Id.
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present in “either version of Dodd-Frank that was passed by the House and
the Senate.”129  Rather, “no one seems to know whence it came.”130
Third, due to a lack of legislative history, the court reviewed the appli-
cable case law on the issue.131  On one hand, the Second Circuit cited
various district court cases and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi, where
the court had found “[the § 78u-6(a)(6)] definition of whistleblower con-
trolling.”132  Conversely, the Second Circuit further cited the “far larger
number of district courts” that have relied upon Chevron and found the
SEC’s interpretation to be reasonable.133  Similar to those district courts,
the issue presented to the Second Circuit was whether the statutory defini-
tion of whistleblower applies to Subdivision (iii), or if the answer is suffi-
ciently unclear to warrant Chevron deference.134
Fourth, the majority highlighted that the SEC, Berman, and WPP sep-
arately argued that the outcome of the case “would render some language
of Dodd-Frank superfluous.”135  However, the court found none of the
arguments persuasive.136  Particularly, the court distinguished between
129. See id. at 152–53 (explaining legislative history of Subdivision (iii) of
Dodd-Frank).  The court noted that “[s]ubdivision (iii) first saw the light of day in
that conference base text when it was added to follow subdivisions (i) and (ii) . . .
both of which had been in the Senate version.”  Id.  However, neither Subdivision
(iii) nor its purpose was mentioned in the legislative material. See id. (explaining
legislative history).  Within the legislative materials, there is mention only of “[Sub-
title B of Title IX] further enhanc[ing] incentives and protection for
whistleblowers providing information leading to a successful SEC enforcement ac-
tions.” See id. (alteration in original) (quoting H. REP. NO. 111-517, at 870
(2009–10) (Conf. Rep.)).
130. Id. at 153 (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir.
1975), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247
(2010)) (explaining legislative history of Subdivision (iii) of Dodd-Frank).
131. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 153 (reviewing relevant precedent).
132. See id. (referencing decisions in which Dodd-Frank’s definition of
whistleblowers was viewed as controlling).
133. See id. at 153 (noting cases in favor of applying Chevron deference).
134. See id. at 151 (inquiring whether Chevron deference is applicable); see also
id. at 154 (“[T]he issue . . . is not whether to read the words of the definition[ ] . . .
literally, but the different issue of whether the definition should apply to a [ ]
subdivision of a subsection that uses the defined term.”).
135. See id. (explaining parties’ and SEC’s arguments).
Berman contends that if subdivision (iii) is subject to the [SEC] reporting
requirement by virtue of subsection 21F(a)(6), then most of subdivision
(iii) would be superfluous because the Sarbanes-Oxley protections . . .
would have no effect.  The SEC argues that if the definition of
‘whistleblower’ applies . . . then the [SEC] reporting requirement . . .
would be superfluous.  Neo contends that if subdivision (iii) does not re-
quire an employee to report violations to the [SEC], then the SEC report-
ing requirement . . . would be superfluous . . . .  All these arguments
ignore the realities of the legislative process.
Id.
136. See id. (“In deciding whether sufficient ambiguity exists in Dodd-Frank to
warrant deference to the SEC’s Rule, we note, but are not persuaded by, the argu-
ments that any reading would render some language of Dodd-Frank superflu-
ous.”).  Berman claimed Subdivision (iii) would be “superfluous” if Dodd-Frank’s
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the legislature’s use of the word “Commission” in Subdivisions (i) and (ii)
of the anti-retaliation provisions and the lack of such wording in Subdivi-
sion (iii).137  Under its textual analysis of Dodd-Frank, the majority was
uncertain as to the goal of Congress in leaving “Commission” out of Subdi-
vision (iii).138  Nonetheless, the court did not believe the drafters “would
have expected it to have the extremely limited scope it would have if it
were restricted by the [SEC] reporting requirement in the ‘whistleblower’
definition in subsection 21F(a)(6).”139
Due to the Second Circuit’s uncertainty after reviewing the legislative
history, precedent, and statutory text surrounding Dodd-Frank, the major-
ity applied Chevron deference and called on the SEC to “resolve the ambi-
guity” that was presented before the court.140  Thus, in conjunction with
SEC’s interpretation, the Second Circuit held that, even though Berman
did not report his allegations to the SEC, under Dodd-Frank, his internal
reports to Neo and WPP were sufficient to grant him protection against
definition of whistleblower applied because Sarbanes-Oxley would have no effect.
See id. (restating Berman’s argument).  On the other hand, Neo advocated that if
individuals did not have to report to the SEC under Subdivision (iii), Dodd-Frank’s
definition of whistleblower, which requires reporting to the SEC, would become
meaningless. See id. (restating Neo’s argument).
137. See id. (finding Subdivision (iii) “expands the protections of Dodd-Frank
to include the whistleblower protection provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley . . . which . . . do not require reporting violations to the [SEC]”).  The court
compared the use of the word “Commission” in “[s]ubdivisions (i) and (ii), which
were included in the Senate version of Dodd-Frank before the conferees met.”  Id.
(relying on legislative history in analyzing Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provi-
sions).  Specifically, while “[s]ubdivision (i) explicitly requires reporting ‘to the
Commission,’ and subdivision (ii) concern assisting action ‘of the Commission’ . . .
subdivision (iii) do[es] neither.” Id.
138. See id. at 155 (questioning whether “conferees, at the last minute, in-
serted subdivision (iii) within subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) . . . to . . . limit[ ] . . . the
statutory definition of ‘whistleblower’ in subsection 21F(a)(6), or . . . [to permit]
employees to be protected by subdivision (iii) whenever they report violations in-
ternally, without reporting to the [SEC]”).
139. See id. (opining that Dodd-Frank’s lack of legislative history suggests
broad reading of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision).
140. See id. (analyzing whether Dodd-Frank is ambiguous enough to apply
Chevron deference).  The court emphasized that instead of “definitively con-
stru[ing] the statute,” it needed only to determine if the “tension” renders the
statute “ambiguous to obligate [the court] to give Chevron deference to the reason-
able interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute.” See id.
(explaining analysis of Chevron deference).
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retaliation.141  Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded
the case to the district court.142
2. No Internal Whistleblowers Allowed: The Dissent Calls for the Fifth Circuit’s
Reasoning
Instead of calling on the SEC for help, the dissent urged the court to
apply the Asadi standard because the court’s “obligation is to apply con-
gressional statutes as written.”143  The dissent reasoned that Berman
would have been protected under Sarbanes-Oxley because Sarbanes-Oxley
governs protection of internal whistleblowers, even if they are not pro-
tected under Dodd-Frank.144  Further, the dissent argued “the SEC and
the majority perceive[d] a hole in coverage, or an insufficiency of remedy,
and are patching.”145
Rather than apply Chevron, the dissent considered the statutory text to
be unambiguous.146  First, it determined that Subdivision (iii) protects
only a whistleblower, which “is a defined term[,]” and does not protect an
employee, as noted in Sarbanes-Oxley.147  Second, the dissent focused on
the definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank, which “provides that
[it] ‘shall apply’ anywhere else ‘[i]n this section.’”148  Third, the dissent
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that a literal application of Subdi-
141. See id. (deferring to SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank).  Instead of
favoring a broad interpretation of Dodd-Frank, the majority deferred to the SEC’s
interpretation. See id. (“We need not resolve the ambiguity ourselves, but will defer
to the reasonable interpretive rule by the [SEC].”).  Relying on the SEC’s interpre-
tation, the majority held that Berman’s report to his employers regarding the com-
pany’s suspected wrongdoing was enough to grant him Dodd-Frank protection,
even though he did not directly report to the SEC. See id. (applying SEC’s inter-
pretation of Dodd-Frank to Berman’s actions).
142. See id. (reversing and remanding case).
143. See id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (advocating Asadi rationale).
144. See id. at 155–56 (contending Sarbanes-Oxley, rather than Dodd-Frank,
governs Berman’s case).  While Dodd-Frank protects whistleblowers who report to
the SEC directly, “Sarbanes-Oxley protects employees who blow a whistle to man-
agement or to regulatory agencies.” See id. at 156.  The dissent claimed that
Berman’s internal reports to his employer would provide protection under
Sarbanes-Oxley. See id. (explaining protection for whistleblowers under Sarbanes-
Oxley).
145. Id. at 156 (opining that majority ignored plain reading of Dodd-Frank).
146. See id. (“This definition, standing alone, expressly and unambiguously
requires that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a
‘whistleblower’ for purposes of § 78u-6.” (quoting Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013))).
147. See id. at 157 (distinguishing use of “whistleblower” in Subdivision (iii) of
Dodd-Frank from use of “employee” in Sarbanes-Oxley).
148. See id. at 156 (alteration in original) (contending Dodd-Frank’s defini-
tion of whistleblower is unambiguous).  From the definition, the dissent empha-
sized that the court knows: “(1) who is protected; and (2) what actions by
protected individuals constitute protected activity.” See id. at 157 (quoting Asadi,
720 F.3d at 625).  The dissent further explained that: (1)  a whistleblower is pro-
tected, and (2)  the actions protected are “‘any lawful act done by the
whistleblower’ that falls within one of the three categories of action described in
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vision (iii) would have an “extremely limited scope” because the majority
provided no support for its reasoning.149
Analyzing these three factors, the dissent urged that Asadi should gov-
ern because the statutory language is unambiguous.150  Accordingly,
Berman could have received protection under Sarbanes-Oxley for inter-
nally reporting had he followed its statutory requirements; however, the
dissent reasoned that under the language of Dodd-Frank, Berman should
not have received protection for his internal reports.151  For these reasons,
the dissent would have affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the
motion to dismiss.152
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF DODD-FRANK
SUMMONS UNNECESSARY GHOSTS
Although the Second Circuit’s evaluation of Dodd-Frank in Berman
increased whistleblower protection, in doing so, the majority incorrectly
applied Chevron deference to Dodd-Frank’s express and unambiguous def-
inition of whistleblower, sidestepping Sarbanes-Oxley.153  First, under the
principles of statutory interpretation, Dodd-Frank’s definition of
whistleblower is clear and unambiguous.154  Second, because the defini-
tion of whistleblower is unambiguous, Chevron deference to the SEC is not
applicable.155  Third, there is no need to expand Dodd-Frank’s protection
to employees who report violations to their employers because Sarbanes-
Oxley already grants adequate protection.156  Therefore, the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning should apply to prevent an improper replication of
Sarbanes-Oxley that would render it obsolete.157
the statute.” See id. (quoting Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625) (explaining conclusion that
Dodd-Frank provision at issue is unambiguous).
149. See id. at 158 (urging there is no support for majority’s claim that literally
reading Subdivision (iii) “leave[s] [it] . . . with ‘extremely limited scope’” (quoting
id. at 151)).
150. See id. at 160 (concluding Dodd-Frank is unambiguous).
151. See id. at 159 (opining Berman’s cases should be governed by Sarbanes-
Oxley instead of Dodd-frank under Asadi).
152. See id. (opining Neo and WPP’s motion to dismiss should be affirmed).
153. See id. at 155–56 (contending Sarbanes-Oxley governs Berman’s case in-
stead of Dodd-Frank).
154. For a further discussion of applying the principles of statutory interpreta-
tion to Dodd-Frank, see infra notes 158–66 and accompanying text.
155. For a further discussion of the inapplicability of Chevron deference to
Dodd-Frank, see infra notes 167–75 and accompanying text.
156. For a further discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley providing protection to inter-
nal reporters instead of Dodd-Frank, see infra notes 176–81 and accompanying
text.
157. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629–30 (5th Cir.
2013) (claiming Sarbanes-Oxley will become moot if Dodd-Frank’s protection is
expanded).
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A. Whistleblowers Are Not an Apparition: Applying the Plain Meaning
of the Definition of Whistleblowers
The Second Circuit created inconsistency in Dodd-Frank’s definition
of whistleblower by ignoring the plain meaning of the definition.158  The
court’s “obligation is to apply [the] congressional statute as written[,]” not
to assist in reconstructing the statute for optimal whistleblower protec-
tion.159  The plain language of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition
makes clear that protection is granted to individuals who report suspicions
to the SEC.160  When comparing the anti-retaliation provisions to the defi-
nition, Subdivision (iii) is a subsection of “section (h), which relates only
to ‘whistleblowers[,]’” a term that is expressly defined in Dodd-Frank.161
Accordingly, subdivision (iii) is subordinate to the whistleblower defini-
158. See Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quot-
ing Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622) (“When faced with questions of statutory construction,
‘we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambigu-
ous’ . . . .”).  In determining if the statute is ambiguous, the court “reference[s] [ ]
the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.” See id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)).
159. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (Ja-
cobs, J. dissenting) (declaring majority opinion and SEC are ignoring Dodd-
Frank’s strict reading).  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit explained the “plain-meaning”
canon of statutory interpretation requires the court to apply the statute’s text if
clear. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622–25 (explaining Fifth Circuit’s statutory interpreta-
tion analysis).  Congress used the statutorily-defined term “whistleblower” through-
out the anti-retaliation section, which illustrates that the definition applies
throughout. See id. at 622–27 (analyzing Dodd-Frank’s text).  Congress could have
used more neutral words, such “employee” or “individual,” but chose to use the
word “whistleblower throughout” the statute. See id. (analyzing statutory text); see
also Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *5
(D. Colo. July 19, 2013) (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009))
(“When the statutory text is plain and unambiguous, it is the Court’s job to apply
the statute according to its terms.”); Deykes v. Cooper-Standard Auto., Inc., Case
No. 2:16-cv-11828, 2016 WL 6873395, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2016) (stating
courts are not responsible for setting optimum policy).
160. See Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (applying principles of statutory inter-
pretation).  Dodd-Frank specifies who a whistleblower is in § 78u-6(a)(6), and the
later provision of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is subordinate to the definition. See id. (analyz-
ing Dodd-Frank’s text); see also Deykes, 2016 WL 6873395, at *2 (citing Antonin
Scalia et al., READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 226 (1st ed.
2012)) (“[W]hen a ‘statute’s definitional section says a word means something, the
clear import is that this is the only meaning.”).
161. See Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (“[T]he ‘whistleblower protection’ pro-
vided by Section 78u-6(h) is only available to individuals who meet the Dodd-Frank
definition of “whistleblower found in Section 78u-6(a).”); Wagner, 2013 WL
3786643, at *5 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013) (“No matter what else one might say about
subsection (iii), it is part of section (h) which relates only to ‘whistleblowers.’ That
term is defined in the statute . . . .  There is no separate or different definition of
‘whistleblower’ in subsection (iii).”); see also Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Bar-
ney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 653 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (“[Dodd-Frank provides]
only one definition of a whistleblower, and it is found in the definition section.”),
aff’d, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), petition for cert. denied,
No. 16-946, 2017 WL 434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).
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tion because “[r]eporting to the SEC is the precondition that triggers the
anti-retaliation protection of the statute.”162  However, rather than focus
on applying the statutory text of Dodd-Frank, the majority improperly fo-
cused on increasing whistleblower protection.163  The danger in the ma-
jority’s approach is that judges may be inclined to interpret whistleblower
statutes beyond their intended reach.164  When drafting Dodd-Frank, if
Congress wanted to broaden Dodd-Frank’s definition, it could have used a
more generic and broad term than “whistleblower,” as it did in Sarbanes-
Oxley.165  Yet, because “Congress . . . used the term ‘whistleblower’
throughout . . . we must give that language effect.”166
B. Boo!: Scaring Away the Majority’s Chevron Deference
Chevron deference is inapplicable because Congress expressly ad-
dressed who qualifies as a whistleblower in Dodd-Frank’s definition sec-
tion.167  The SEC is authorized to release its opinion and file amicus briefs
to advocate its position, but ultimately, the interpretation resides in the
courts.168  If courts were to defer to the SEC’s interpretation, the defini-
162. See Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (holding Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
provisions do not apply to employees who internally report suspected
wrongdoing).
163. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622 (quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387
(2009)) (“When faced with questions of statutory construction, ‘we must first de-
termine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous’ and, ‘[i]f it is, we
must apply the statute according to its terms.’” (alteration in original).  Thus, the
court’s analysis “begins and ends with the text.” See id. at 622 (citing Bedroc Ltd.,
LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).  To find Dodd-Frank unambigu-
ous would be ignoring applicable canons of statutory interpretation. See Banko, 20
F. Supp. 3d at 756 (finding Dodd-Frank unambiguous under canons of statutory
interpretation).
164. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“The only palpable
danger lurking here is that bureaucrats and federal judges assume and exercise
power to redraft a statute to give it a more respectable reach.”); see also Englehart v.
Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *9 (M.D. Fla.
May 12, 2014) (declaring that courts are not responsible for interpreting statutes
to reach desired results).
165. See Verble, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644 at 653–54 (noting Congress chose to limit
scope of Dodd-Frank instead of using more generic terms like it did when drafting
Sarbanes-Oxley); Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (explaining Congress could have
used more generic terms than “whistleblower” with respect to Dodd-Frank).
166. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626–27 (analyzing Congress’ use of specific words in
Dodd-Frank); Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (“Congress could have used a word
other than ‘whistleblower’ but chose not to.”).
167. See id. at 630 (“Because Congress has directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue, we must reject the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term
‘whistleblower.’”). Chevron deference is not needed when the term ‘whistleblower’
is clearly defined in the statute. See Walker, supra note 93, at 1769 & n.66 (citing
cases relying on Asadi) (explaining Chevron deference is applicable when statutory
text is ambiguous).
168. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 620 (refusing to extend Dodd-Frank’s statutory
reach despite SEC’s opinion); see also Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (“Congress
could not have defined ‘whistleblower’ more clearly, and yet the SEC apparently
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tion of whistleblower in Dodd-Frank and the terms in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)
would be read out of the statute.169  Specifically, there would be no pur-
pose to the phrase “to the Commission” in the statutory definition of
whistleblower if Dodd-Frank whistleblower expanded to internal report-
ers.170  Such an interpretation would render the definition of
whistleblower meaningless.171  Instead, Congress requires an individual to
meet the definition of whistleblower before being granted anti-retaliation
protection under one of the § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) categories.172  Because
Sarbanes-Oxley was already enacted to protect internal reporters when
Dodd-Frank was created, Congress’s intent is clear in creating different
protection measures for external reporters.173  Furthermore, while the
Constitution empowers Congress with the ability to “legislate . . . . [t]he
SEC does not have the power to re-write legislation, and neither does the
believes that entire definition should be case aside on the flimsy grounds that Con-
gress really didn’t mean it.”).  The SEC’s interpretation does not resolve the issue
because it is the courts who are the “arbiter of statutory construction” and there-
fore “are not obligated to follow” the Commission’s interpretation. See SEC Issues
Interpretation Regarding Definition of “Whistleblower” Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision, supra note 71 (emphasizing federal court’s responsibility in
interpreting issues).
169. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628 (noting that § 78u-6(a) would be superfluous if
Subdivision (iii) were treated as exception); Lamb v. Rockwell Automation Inc.,
Case No. 15-CV-1415-JPS, 2016 WL 4273210, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2016) (“To
allow the SEC’s rule to hold otherwise would read that . . . term itself out of Sub-
section 78u-6(h)(1)(A).”); Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46 (“If the Dodd-Frank
protections were construed broadly, it would essentially replicate and render moot
the [Sarbanes-Oxley] whistleblower protections already in place . . . .”); see also
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756–57 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Construing the
statute in this matter would violate the surplusage canon that every word is to be
given effect.” (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001))).
170. See Deykes v. Cooper-Standard Auto., Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-11828, 2016
WL 6873395, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2016) (“If the Court were to adopt Deyke’s
definition of ‘whistleblower,’ the words ‘to the Commission’ would serve no pur-
pose at all.”).
171. See Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (“The SEC’s interpretation renders an
entire section of the statute superfluous, namely, the definition of ‘whistleblower’
itself.”).
172. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628 (explaining § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) only explains
conduct protected under Dodd-Frank instead and does not define whistleblower).
“Specifically, this category [subsection (iii)] protects whistleblowers from retalia-
tion, based not on the individual’s disclosure of information to the SEC but, in-
stead, on that individual’s other possible required or protected disclosure(s).” Id.
at 627.
173. See Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46 (“If the Dodd-Frank protections
were construed broadly, it would essentially replicate and render moot the SOX
whistleblower protections already in place, which do not require reporting directly
to the SEC.  Thus, it makes much more sense to assume that Congress was attempt-
ing to create something different than pre-existing law, and it did so by defining
‘whistleblower’ and then creating certain protections for those who qualify.”).
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[c]ourt.”174  Accordingly, Chevron deference should not be applied be-
cause Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower is unambiguous.175
C. Alive and Well: Sarbanes-Oxley Grants Proper Protection
Even if whistleblowers cannot obtain protection under Dodd-Frank,
those who internally report wrongdoing can seek protection under
Sarbanes-Oxley.176  The only consequence of applying Dodd-Frank as writ-
ten is that such whistleblowers would not reap the financial incentives and
whistleblower-friendly benefits of Dodd-Frank.177  However, those conse-
quences do not prevent protection and relief under Sarbanes-Oxley.178  If
Congress wanted to replace Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection
174. Deykes, 2016 WL 6873395, at *3 (emphasizing Congress’s responsibility to
enact laws).
175. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626–27 (explaining that Chevron deference does
not apply to Dodd-Frank); Deykes, 2016 WL 6873395, at *3 (quoting Asadi, 720 F.3d
at 622) (“To give [Dodd-Frank] another construction would require an unnatural
reading.  The [c]ourt will not strain to find a contradiction where none exists.
Rather, the [c]ourt must ‘interpret provisions of a statute in a manner that renders
them compatible, not contradictory.’”).
176. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2015)
(Jacobs, J., dissenting) (emphasizing whistleblowers who internally report sus-
pected violations of securities law are not without protection).  Rather, Berman
filed his whistleblower retaliation claim under the wrong statute. See id. (noting
Berman could have received protection under Sabarnes-Oxley instead of Dodd-
Frank).  The Fifth Circuit similarly recognized that Asadi could have raised a retali-
ation claim under Sarbanes-Oxley. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628 n.11 (noting
Sarbanes-Oxley would have granted Asadi proper retaliation protection).  An indi-
vidual’s failure to file under Sarbanes-Oxley may “lead to unfortunate results[,]”
but this outcome is not due to lack of available protection. See Banko, 20 F. Supp.
3d at 757 (“While this forfeiture may sometimes lead to unfortunate results where
individuals who take socially-desirous actions fail to be granted protection, this
conclusion comes as the result of that individual’s own delay and does not bear
upon the availability of . . . relief.”).
177. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 160 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (declaring Berman
would still have received whistleblower protection under Sarbanes-Oxley).  Under
Sarbanes-Oxley, a whistleblower would receive “the same protection every securi-
ties whistleblower had before the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, and more protec-
tion that any securities whistleblower had before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in
2002.”  Id.  There would be “[n]o market collapses, no castles fall[ing]” under a
strict reading of Dodd-Frank. See id. at 159 (emphasizing that there would be no
negative consequences to using strict reading of Dodd-Frank).  In contrast to
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank provides plaintiffs greater monetary damages, the
ability to file first in federal court, and a longer statute of limitations. See Asadi, 720
F.3d at 629 (comparing benefits of bringing claim under Dodd-Frank versus
Sarbanes-Oxley).  For a further discussion of Dodd-Frank’s incentives and proce-
dures as compared to those provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, see supra notes 53–64 and
accompanying text.
178. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (Jacobs, J. dissenting) (explaining that
Berman could still receive protection under Sarbanes-Oxley); Verble v. Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 653–54 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (noting
plaintiffs may still seek protection under Sarbanes-Oxley), aff’d, No. 15-6397, 2017
WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), petition for cert. denied, No. 16-946, 2017 WL
434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).
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program, Congress could have done so itself.179  The enactment of both
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank illustrates Congress’s intent to create a
different type of protection.180  Yet, by finding a way around Sarbanes-
Oxley, the majority’s decision superseded Sarbanes-Oxley, rendering it
obsolete.181
V. GHOST OF WHISTLEBLOWERS YET TO COME
After Berman, and in conjunction with Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-
Oxley, an employee should report suspected wrongdoing in the workplace
to the SEC to be protected from retaliation and remove any question as to
whether the employee is a whistleblower for purposes of Dodd-Frank and
Sarbanes-Oxley.182  Employees may shift their reports to the SEC instead
of internally reporting first because of this uncertainty.183  In addition,
179. See Walker, supra note 93, at 1769 (“Because Congress did not act to
extend the anti[-]retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank to internal whistleblowers,
such whistleblower could not be protected.”); see also Deykes, 2016 WL 6873395, at
*2 (emphasizing Congress’s responsibility in writing and enacting laws); Verfuerth,
65 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46 (stating that it makes more sense for Congress to have
wanted different whistleblower protections because protection afforded by statutes
is different); Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 757 (illustrating that plaintiffs can still re-
ceive protection under Sarbanes-Oxley, even if Dodd-Frank is not expanded).
180. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630 (explaining Congress’ intent is clear because
Congress defined whistleblower in § 78u-6(a)(6) of Dodd-Frank); Verfuerth, 65 F.
Supp. 3d at 645–46 (“[I]t makes much more sense to assume that Congress was
attempting to create something different than pre-existing law, and it did so by de-
fining ‘whistleblower’ and then creating certain protections for those who qual-
ify.”).  “Congress specified that a ‘whistleblower,’ not merely any individual, is
protected from employer retaliation on the basis of the whistleblower’s protected
activities.” Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.  Congress clearly defines a whistleblower as an
individual who provided information of suspected securities law violations to the
SEC. See id. (finding Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower to be clear).  Further, the dissent
in Berman separately defined Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection as protect-
ing employees who report suspected violations to employers and that of Dodd-
Frank as individuals who report suspected violations to the SEC. See Berman, 801
F.3d at 156 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between whistleblowers under
Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley).  Without evidence of Congress’s intention in
drafting Dodd-Frank, the court should presume that Congress “says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” See Verble, 148 F. Supp. 3d
at 656 (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (analyzing Congress’s intent in enacting
Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley).
181. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629–30 (stating Dodd-Frank will become moot if
statute replicates Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections).
182. See DuBon, supra note 94, at 3 (explaining employees who are unsure
regarding whom to contact for whistleblower protection should contact SEC be-
cause of certainty in protection).  In the event that an employee directly reports to
the SEC, reporting would “eliminate any inquiry as to whether the employee quali-
fies as a ‘whistle-blower.’” See id.  Further, “[i]t is well-settled that whistleblower
protections of [Sarbanes-Oxley] apply regardless of whether an employee reports
to the SEC.”  Shen, supra note 53, at 1 (explaining whistleblowers enjoy better
protection if they report to SEC).
183. See DuBon, supra note 94, at 3 (explaining employees’ motivation to re-
port externally).
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employers may expect a continued shift in more actions filed under Dodd-
Frank than under Sarbanes-Oxley because of Dodd-Frank’s increased in-
centives.184  Employers, particularly those in the Second Circuit, should
therefore be mindful that they could be held liable for retaliatory actions
against internal whistleblowers.185  As the circuit split continues to blur
the distinction between Dodd-Frank’s and Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower
programs, employers should take measures to mitigate whistleblower retal-
iation risks.186  On one side, applying Asadi may encourage employees to
report to the SEC, despite employer compliance programs, to ensure pro-
184. See Shen, supra note 53, at 4 (“[The] plaintiff-friendly aspects of Dodd-
Frank may in turn affect the frequency with which employees file whistleblower
retaliation claims . . . .”).  As Shen notes, with the plaintiff-friendly decision in
Berman, the expanded protection of Dodd-Frank may result in an increase in anti-
retaliation protection claims for internal whistleblowers under the statute. See id.
(explaining potential impact of Berman on future claims); Tracey Richelle High et
al., Who Do Dodd-Franks’ Anti-Retaliation Provisions Protect, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 13,
2016), https://www.bna.com/doddfranks-antiretaliation-provisions-n730144485
03/ [https://perma.cc/UG3C-A6FA] (“Acceptance of the broad interpretation of
the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision renders SOX cause of action dead letter
to a significant extent, as the Dodd-Frank cause of action is far more enticing indi-
viduals given its procedural and substantive advantages); 2016 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 61, at 1 (illustrating increasing number of Dodd-Frank whistleblower
claims and awards).
185. See Baker & Flinn, supra note 20 (analyzing effect of Berman on future
cases); Goldin et al., supra note 20, at 3 (explaining implications of circuit split).
Companies should be aware of the circuit split, particularly in the Second Circuit,
and understand that employees who internally report suspected wrongdoing, but
not to the SEC, could obtain anti-retaliation protection under Dodd-Frank. See id.
(emphasizing importance of employer awareness of Berman’s decision in certain
jurisdiction).  In an effort to prevent liability and mitigate risk, companies should
review their whistleblower policies and procedures, particularly because of growing
whistleblower complaints. See Hamid et al., supra note 65 (discussing ways compa-
nies can prevent liability stemming from future retaliation claims brought by
whistleblowers).
186. See Baker & Flinn, supra note 20 (suggesting employers be aware of split
in order to mitigate liability); see also McLucas et al., supra note 20 (suggesting
strategies for employers to limit whistleblower retaliation liability).  Employers
“should consider” the following strategies:
[1] processes to review internal reports of compliance concerns;
[2] written procedures for safeguarding the identity of reporting
employees;
[3] periodic mandatory training for managers on confidentiality and
anti-retaliation;
[4] well publicized communications across the organization about inter-
nal reporting mechanisms;
[5] regular formal opportunities for internal reporting, including during
annual certification and employee exit processes; and
[6] internal processes to resolve retaliation complaints.
Id.  In addition, employers may “implement[ ] compliance programs that strongly
encourage internal reporting, while simultaneously promoting policies and prac-
tices to reassure employees that internal disclosures will not result in adverse em-
ployment action against the disclosing employee.” Shen, supra note 53, at 4
(suggesting policy changes for employers).
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tection.187  Conversely, applying Berman may result in an employer’s in-
creased liability and litigation costs stemming from retaliation claims.188
Employers will have to adapt to the divergent impact on their companies
regardless of the circuit split’s final resolution.189
This trend of uncertainty has continued in the district courts during
the past year.190  Further, the divide between the narrower and broader
interpretations of Dodd-Frank has remained among circuit courts, as
well.191  The Sixth Circuit heard an appeal on a similar issue but affirmed
the lower court’s decision to prevent protection to an internal
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank on different grounds.192  However, the
187. See Shen, supra note 53, at 4 (explaining consequences of Supreme
Court decision favoring Asadi).  Employees may be encouraged to ignore an em-
ployer’s internal reporting programs and report suspect wrongdoing to the SEC to
guarantee protection under Dodd-Frank. See id. (discussing employee’s potential
actions to receive protection).  Such consequence may result in increased SEC en-
forcement, financial harm, and “reputational [risks]” to the employers if employ-
ees consistently report to the SEC. See id. (discussing impact of employees
reporting wrongdoing externally); Martin T. Wymer, Ninth Circuit Widens the Circuit
Split on Whether Dodd-Frank Protects Internal Whistleblowers, BAKERHOSTETLER (Mar.
14, 2017), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/ninth-circuit-widens-the-circuit-split-
on-whether-dodd-frank-protects-internal-whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/47U7-
P3UM] (“[I]f the Asadi view is adopted, employees . . . may be encouraged to
report to the SEC to obtain additional Dodd-Frank protections . . . .”).
188. See id. (explaining consequences of Supreme Court decision favoring
Berman).
189. See id. (“Regardless of how the court split is resolved, the outcome may
yield a double-edged sword for employers.”).
190. Compare Wiggins v. ING U.S., Inc., Civil Case No. 3:14-CV-01089 (JCH),
2015 WL 8779559, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2015) (“In light of Berman, the court
now holds that Wiggins is entitled to file a Second Amended Complaint, which will
include a Dodd-Frank claim . . . .”), appeal dismissed, No. 15-2262 (2d Cir. Sept. 19,
2016), and Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., Case No. 4:14CV183 RLW, 2015 WL
7306443, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 19, 2015) (“Based upon the SEC’s new interpretive
rule and the decision of Berman . . . the [c]ourt finds that Dodd-Frank is ambigu-
ous and Court affords deference to [the SEC].”), with Lamb v. Rockwell Automa-
tion Inc., Case No. 15-CV-1415-JPS, 2016 WL 4273210, at *4 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 12,
2016) (finding Asadi persuasive), and Puffenbarger v. Engility Corp., 151 F. Supp.
3d 651, 664–65 (E.D. Va. 2015) (accepting Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Asadi), and
Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 653 n.6 (E.D.
Tenn. 2015) (recognizing Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Asadi was similar to that of
court), aff’d, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), petition for cert.
denied, No. 16-946, 2017 WL 434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017); see also Baker & Flinn,
supra note 20 (analyzing effect of Berman on future cases).
191. See Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., No. 15-17352, 2017 WL 908245, at *1
(9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017) (determining issue of whether Dodd-Frank protects inter-
nal whistleblowers); Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 15-6397,
2017 WL 129040, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017) (analyzing issue of whether Dodd-
Frank should be expanded).
192. See DuBon, supra note 94, at 3 (predicting Sixth Circuit would face simi-
lar issue in Verble); see also Verble, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 647–48 (holding whistleblowers
under Dodd-Frank must notify SEC to receive retaliation protection).  An em-
ployee of Morgan Stanley alleged he was terminated after he became aware of his
employer’s criminal conduct and started to leak information to the government.
See Verble, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 647–48 (explaining facts of case).  The employee
37
Mickles: If There's Something Strange in Your Workplace, Who Ya Gonna Call
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
394 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 357
Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s “[p]etition for [w]rit of [c]ertiorari,
thereby declining an opportunity to resolve the conflict amongst circuit
courts.”193  In March 2017, the Ninth Circuit continued the divide by rul-
ing in favor of the Second Circuit’s opinion.194  Further, changes in the
new administration and the appointment of a new Supreme Court Justice
may influence a final decision on the split.195  Regardless, the issue will
ultimately be left unresolved until it reaches the Supreme Court.196  In the
meantime, if there is something strange in the workplace, employees are
not entirely certain who to call.197
subsequently filed claims under Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the False Claims
Act, but because the employee did not follow Sarbanes-Oxley procedures properly,
the trial court dismissed his Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claim for lack of jurisdic-
tion. See id.  In addition, the court dismissed the employee’s Dodd-Frank claim by
relying on Asadi. See id.  The district court held that the plaintiff improperly waited
to provide information to the SEC once he was terminated and, therefore, did not
qualify as a whistleblower in the definition of section 78u-6(a)(6). See Noller et al.,
supra note 61 (reporting Verble court declined to follow Berman).  The district court
further held that there was no alternative definitions of “whistleblower” under
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A), contrary to the SEC’s opinion. See id.  Accordingly, the district
court found the plaintiff was not a whistleblower under § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). See
id.  On appeal, a unanimous bench affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s Dodd-
Frank claim but on “grounds . . . not relied on by the district court.” See Verble,
2017 WL 129040, at *4 (denying plaintiff’s Dodd-Frank claims on different
grounds).
193. See Harris M. Mufson, U.S. Supreme Court Passes on Opportunity to Address
Scope of Dodd-Frank “Whistleblower” Provision, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 23, 2017), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/us-supreme-court-passes-opportunity-to-address-
scope-dodd-frank-whistleblower [https://perma.cc/MNC9-MB63] (reporting that
plaintiff’s writ of certiorari in Verble was denied).  The Supreme Court could hear a
future case on the issue out of the Third Circuit in Danon. See id. (noting potential
future writ of certiorari from Third Circuit).
194. See Somers, 2017 WL 908245, at *1 (holding employees who report sus-
pected wrongdoing internally are granted protection under Dodd-Frank without
having to report to SEC).
195. See Wymer, supra note 187 (“Judge Gorsuch . . . has demonstrated that he
is no fan of Chevron deference, and his addition to the Court may increase the
chance that a majority will interpret Dodd-Frank’s terms consistent with their plain
meaning.”).  Moreover, under the Trump administration, the SEC may revisit its
interpretation of Dodd-Frank protection, or the legislature may “attempt[ ] to
overhaul Dodd-Frank[,]” which may impact whistleblower protection. See id. (ex-
plaining potential influence of new administration on Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
protection program).
196. See DuBon, supra note 94, at 3 (predicting Sixth Circuit would face simi-
lar issue in Verble); Mufson, supra note 193 (“Until the Supreme Court addresses
this important issue . . . the courts will continue to issue conflicting decisions as to
who is a covered ‘whistleblower’ under Dodd-Frank.”).
197. For a further discussion of the uncertainty in the courts, see supra notes
76–152 and accompanying text.
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